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A Story of Lengthy Proceedings and Unexplored Shortcuts

 |  February 16, 2026

By: Valentin Hanke (Antitrust Politics)

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    In this article for the Antitrust Politics blog, author Valentin Hanke explores the General Court’s December 2025 judgment bringing the long-running Intel saga to a close. Originating from AMD’s complaint over Intel’s rebate schemes and so-called “naked restrictions,” the case clarified several procedural points: the Commission need not re-prove settled findings after partial annulment, a new statement of objections is required only when new facts—not merely new legal theories—arise, and excessive procedural delay does not automatically justify a fine reduction. Although Intel’s fine was reduced due to an overstated assessment of gravity and duration, delay alone was not sufficient grounds.

    Hanke situates the ruling within a broader concern about the length of EU antitrust proceedings. A 2025 Commission study found that prohibition decisions under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 take on average 45 months, while commitment decisions under Article 9 take 26 months. Such delays risk undermining the effectiveness of remedies, particularly in fast-moving digital markets where competitive harm may become irreversible before a final decision is adopted.

    The article then examines whether interim measures under Article 8 could serve as a procedural shortcut. These temporary remedies require both a prima facie infringement and urgency due to serious and irreparable harm to competition. Despite their potential to address immediate risks, the Commission has used interim measures only once since 2003, in the Broadcom case, reflecting the high legal threshold and intrusive nature of such tools.

    Looking ahead to the anticipated 2026 revision of Regulation 1/2003, Hanke questions whether lowering the threshold for interim measures would meaningfully accelerate enforcement. Evidence from Germany suggests that relaxed standards do not necessarily increase their use, and commitment procedures may remain more attractive in practice. At the same time, forthcoming Commission guidelines on exclusionary abuses—potentially shifting away from a strictly effects-based approach—could themselves reshape the duration and structure of dominance proceedings…

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