By John E. Lopatka (The Pennsylvania State University)
When market intermediaries unlawfully acquire market power, vertically related market participants may sue under the antitrust laws to recover damages. Their ability to recover depends upon an intricate set of doctrines that define private standing, including the indirect-purchaser rules set down by the Supreme Court most notably in Illinois Brick. In Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the Court decided the application of the indirect-purchaser rules to a particular kind of intermediary, a platform in a two-sided market. The Article explores private antitrust standing doctrines as they apply to market intermediaries, using Apple to frame the exposition. The Court there held that iPhone owners are not barred by Illinois Brick from recovering damages from Apple for monopolizing the distribution of iPhone apps. The Article argues that the Court may have reached the right result, but not for the right reason. The dissent and Apple reached the wrong result, or at least did not offer the right reason. Apple imposed an ad valorem charge for using its platform in a two-sided transaction market, and in these circumstances, whether iPhone users had a right to sue for damages depends on whether the marginal costs of distribution were positive, a condition that was not addressed.
Featured News
Supreme Court Declines to Hear Realtors’ Appeal, DOJ Antitrust Probe Moves Forward
Jan 13, 2025 by
CPI
Commerzbank Chairman Doubts Amicable Merger with UniCredit After Stake Acquisition
Jan 13, 2025 by
CPI
Senator Warren Presses HUD Nominee on Rent Price-Fixing
Jan 13, 2025 by
CPI
Epic Games CEO Accuses Tech Giants of Shifting Loyalties to Court Trump Administration
Jan 13, 2025 by
CPI
Apple’s New Developer Fees Face Renewed Scrutiny from EU Antitrust Regulators
Jan 13, 2025 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – CRESSE Insights
Dec 19, 2024 by
CPI
Effective Interoperability in Mobile Ecosystems: EU Competition Law Versus Regulation
Dec 19, 2024 by
Giuseppe Colangelo
The Use of Empirical Evidence in Antitrust: Trends, Challenges, and a Path Forward
Dec 19, 2024 by
Eliana Garces
Some Empirical Evidence on the Role of Presumptions and Evidentiary Standards on Antitrust (Under)Enforcement: Is the EC’s New Communication on Art.102 in the Right Direction?
Dec 19, 2024 by
Yannis Katsoulacos
The EC’s Draft Guidelines on the Application of Article 102 TFEU: An Economic Perspective
Dec 19, 2024 by
Benoit Durand