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Autumn 2013, Volume 9, Number 2

SEP-13(2)
 |  Dec 22, 2015

Last June, the U.S. Supreme Court finally tackled Reverse Payments. In Actavis, they leaned away from many lower court decisions and acknowledged that reverse payments (or “pay for delay”) can…

CPI(9)2
 |  Dec 20, 2015

In our Autumn 2013 Journal, we present a Symposium on Antitrust and Intellectual Property, explore Current Cases in Anglo/Lafarge and feature this edition’s Classic, Appropriating the Returns from INdustrial Research…

Supreme Court Rules in Reverse Payment Case
 |  Nov 23, 2015

Kevin Noonan, Sep 30, 2013 In June, the Supreme Court ruled 5-3 in favor of the Federal Trade Commission in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. Writing for the majority (that included…

Evaluating the Size of Reverse Payments In Light of the Supreme Court’s Decision in FTC v. Actavis
 |  Nov 23, 2015

James Langenfeld, Sep 30, 2013 Patent settlement agreements that involve payments from brand-name drug manufacturers to generic drug manufacturers (so called “reverse payments” or “pay for delay”) have been hotly…

Reverse Payments After Actavis
 |  Nov 23, 2015

John Bigelow, Sep 30, 2013 Thirteen years ago-in 2000-the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and private plaintiffs began fighting certain kinds of settlements that sometimes arise in litigation over patents for…

Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development (1950)(reprint)
 |  Jan 22, 2014

Dec 20, 2013 To have the incentive to undertake research and development, a firm must be able to appropriate returns sufficient to make the investment worthwhile. The benefits consumers derive…

An Introduction to Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development
 |  Jan 22, 2014

David Evans, Dec 20, 2013 There are several areas of economics where we know much more today than we did 50 years ago as a result of the accumulation of…

There is Always a First Time: Coordinated Effects via Vertical Structural Changes in Anglo/Lafarge
 |  Jan 22, 2014

Julie Bon, Pietro Crocioni, Francesca Sala, Dec 20, 2013 This article explores the UK Competition Commission’s Anglo/Lafarge merger decision (2012) focusing on the reasoning for a finding of coordinated effects…

Pay-for-Delay
 |  Jan 22, 2014

Fiona Scott Morton, Dec 20, 2013 This article lays out the economics of competition between branded and generic pharmaceuticals and its welfare consequences. I explain the logic behind so-called “pay-for-delay”…

“Pay-for-Delay”: What Do We Disagree On?
 |  Jan 22, 2014

Pierre Regibeau, Dec 20, 2013 Antitrust concerns about “pay-for-delay” patent settlements are based on two theories of harms, one that stresses the need for courts to review the validity of…

Justifying Antitrust Intervention in ICT Sector Patent Disputes: How to Address the Hold-Up Problem
 |  Jan 22, 2014

Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Dec 20, 2013 The economic justification for any regulatory intervention in patent litigation, especially those for standard essential patents, comes from the view that hold-up of users of…

Licensing Of Standard Essential Patents: Antitrust Intervention Is Not Big Enough A Fix
 |  Jan 22, 2014

Eliana Garces, Dec 20, 2013 The recent antitrust interventions against patent holders issuing injunctions to assert standard essential patents have caused a stir and a debate on the role of…

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