In reply to John Coloe.

Who cares? You miss the point. Why does PAN matter if it can't be used to authorise a transaction? Why does malware matter if the data stolen can't be used to authorise a transaction? It doesn't (well, the malware still does to the retailer - but not to the cardholder nor their issuing bank).

The mag stripe remains because of people like you stopping progress, but assuming fallback transactions are prohibited (and if they're not, they should be scrutinised closely by the merchant), the stripe can't be authorised at an EMV-enabled terminal. Ideally, there would come a point where banks would decline to authorise stripe transactions, and eventually the networks refuse to process them at all.

How, exactly, do you propose tokenisation without a chip anyway? You can't change the number on a magnetic stripe each time. Tokenisation, however, should be seen more about privacy than security. EMV has not "been proved to simply shift fraud" - EMV is a solution to counterfeit card fraud, which is a huge problem in the US today. Other forms of card fraud need to be addressed, too, however - where 3D secure, 2FA, etc come in. But none of that negates the need to fix counterfeit card fraud. And there really isn't a fix cheaper than EMV. Even if there was, global interoperability is essential.