Global Payments May Feel US CBDC Ban First

Nothing visibly changed in American payments when the clock struck midnight on Saturday (July 11). Consumers still used cards, bank accounts and cash, and businesses still moved funds through banking networks. Yet the United States had nonetheless made a consequential architectural choice about the future of money.

The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act, which came into law at the stroke of midnight over the weekend, now prohibits the Federal Reserve from issuing or creating a central bank digital currency (CBDC), directly or through an intermediary, until the provision expires on Dec. 31, 2030. The law’s definition is important. It describes a CBDC as a direct liability of the Federal Reserve that is widely available to the public, making the prohibition most clearly a ban on a retail digital dollar.

The ban has been framed primarily as a defense against government surveillance. That concern is explicit in the legislation’s unusual exception for a dollar-denominated currency that is “open, permissionless, and private” and preserves the privacy protections of physical cash. But the more immediate economic effect may have less to do with Americans buying groceries and more to do with what happens when digital euros, digital yuan, tokenized central-bank reserves and privately issued dollar stablecoins begin encountering one another inside global payment systems.

Read more: Crypto Stopped Fighting Banks and Started Copying Them

A Retail CBDC Ban With Wholesale Consequences

The U.S. prohibition is temporary, and the Federal Reserve had not been close to launching a CBDC. In that sense, the legislation prevents an outcome that was already improbable before 2030. PYMNTS reported in January 2025 that when Trump signed an executive order, “Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology,” that touched on many of the crypto sector’s wants, needs and concerns, it included a provision prohibiting the development of a CBDC.

Still, the text in the housing bill that passed into law additionally prohibits until 2030 digital assets that are “substantially similar” to a CBDC, leaving some ambiguity around how far the restriction might reach if the Federal Reserve later wanted to participate in a tokenized wholesale network. Congress would still have to authorize any eventual issuance.

The distinction matters because the most consequential digital-money projects are increasingly aimed at financial institutions rather than consumer wallets. Project Agorá, coordinated by the Bank for International Settlements, has brought together eight central banks and more than 40 regulated institutions to test a shared platform combining tokenized commercial-bank deposits with tokenized central-bank reserves. Its prototype can coordinate payment instructions, compliance and settlement across currencies, with real-value testing planned next.

This is less about creating a new way to pay for coffee than eliminating the multi-day sequence of messages, reconciliations, liquidity movements and correspondent-bank handoffs behind international commerce. If such systems mature while the United States remains unable or unwilling to provide a comparable sovereign digital settlement asset, dollar participation may have to arrive through banks, tokenized deposits or stablecoin issuers instead.

The initiatives springing up around the global blockchain ecosystem are not simply competing tokens. They are competing arrangements for assigning liability, collecting data, providing liquidity and resolving failure.

See also: MiCA Says No Funny Money in Europe’s Stablecoin Basket

The New Money Movement Contest Is Over the Cross-Border Bridges

Infrastructure policy, however, is path-dependent. Banks integrate systems, regulators approve operating models and companies build treasury workflows around what is available. Once liquidity, compliance practices and transaction volume accumulate on particular networks, changing direction becomes expensive.

Global companies are unlikely to choose one form of digital money exclusively. A multinational could receive e-CNY from a Chinese customer, hold a euro-denominated token for European expenses and use dollar stablecoins to pay suppliers elsewhere.

The decisive infrastructure will be the layer connecting those instruments. A digital euro is being designed around European data protections and offline payments. China’s system embeds state-defined controls within its banking architecture. Dollar stablecoins can circulate across public blockchains but usually encounter regulated intermediaries when users enter or leave the banking system.

For corporate treasurers, the question will not be which token moves fastest. It will be which network can guarantee that a conditional payment, foreign-exchange conversion and transfer of an asset either completes together or does not occur at all.

At the same time, “Waiting for Certainty: Why Most CFOs Are Holding Back on Crypto and Stablecoins,” a recent installment of PYMNTS Intelligence’s 2026 Certainty Project, shows that most middle market companies remain cautious about digital assets. Usage is limited, with 13% of firms using stablecoins and 5% employing other cryptocurrencies.

By the time the CBDC ban expires, the central question may no longer be whether Americans want a digital dollar wallet. It may be whether the dollar can enter sovereign digital-payment networks on terms shaped largely by other central banks—or whether dollar stablecoins will become the default bridge between them.