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Cartel Risks in Dual-Distribution Models – Too Soon to Tell?

 |  September 25, 2019

Introduction

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    Consider a typical supply chain – in the market for supply and sale of plastic bottles, for example, the manufacturer procures raw materials from upstream suppliers to manufacture bottles of various colors and sizes. Depending on the size and scale of its business, the manufacturer then engages a distributor or a network of distributors to facilitate downstream sales to the ultimate consumers. While there may be a network of players (such as distributors, sub-distributors, wholesalers, franchisee networks, etc.) to cover the “last mile” to the ultimate consumer, from a competition law perspective, the relevant point is the one at which economic activity occurs between any two given legal entities.

    Under competition rules, these legal relationships
    can either be categorized as “horizontal” (where they occur between entities
    operating at the same level of the supply chain) or “vertical” (where they
    occur between entities operating at different levels of the supply chain).
    Across jurisdictions, horizontal agreements such as cartels are treated more
    severely than vertical restraints, and are considered to be illegal per se.
    In India, cartels are presumed to cause an appreciable adverse effect on
    competition (but this presumption is rebuttable).2 On the
    other hand, testing the legality of vertical restraints requires a balancing
    test between their efficiency-enhancing, pro-competitive effects and their
    anti-competitive effects (a so-called “rule of reason” approach).

    But what happens when in a typical supply chain, a
    manufacturer operates at both the manufacturing level and the distribution
    level (alongside independent distributors), such that, from a demand-side
    perspective, consumers regard them as two alternative sources of supply for the
    same product or brand?

    In antitrust parlance, such hybrid distribution
    models are commonly known as dual-distribution models. On the one hand, the
    manufacturer acts as a supplier of the product to its independent distributors
    (with whom it has vertical relationships). On the other hand, the manufacturer
    also distributes the product directly to consumers and therefore operates at
    the same level in the supply chain as its independent distributors (and
    therefore also has horizontal relationships with them).

    Over decades, the fundamental quandary for courts
    has always been (and continues to be) whether restraints imposed by a dual
    distributor on its independent distributors should be viewed as being
    horizontal or vertical in nature. A further question is whether the “source” of
    the restraint (i.e. whether it was imposed by the manufacturer, or by the
    independent distributors) is a determining factor, or whether the purpose and
    economic effect of the restraint is more relevant for a meaningful assessment.

    It is important to note that a routine exclusive
    distribution or supply restraint in a pure-play distribution arrangement is
    typically assessed under a straightforward and settled rule of reason test.
    This is because, as described above, vertical agreements can have both pro- and
    anti-competitive effects. On the one hand, they can result in benefits to
    consumers, and improve production and distribution processes. But on the other
    hand, they can create entry barriers, foreclose competition, etc.3
    As such, a blanket per se prohibition should not be applied to such
    agreements, since this type of rule is best limited to restraints that always
    (or almost always) restrict competition and/or decrease output of goods or
    services.4

    However, would the rules of the game change simply
    because a manufacturer doubles up as a distributor? Against this background,
    this article seeks to briefly outline case law trends in the treatment of such
    hybrid distribution restrictions in other jurisdictions and queries their
    implications for Indian enforcement.

    Exploring International
    Jurisprudence

    Historically, both vertical price- and non-price
    restraints were tested under a per se rule in most jurisdictions. One of
    the earliest cases concerning dual distribution was United States v.
    McKesson & Robbins, Inc.
    (“McKesson”).5
    McKesson was one of the largest manufacturers of drugs in the U.S. It
    distributed drugs through independent wholesalers, but also operated as a
    wholesaler itself. McKesson had entered into so-called “fair trade” agreements
    with independent wholesalers to set the resale price of drugs. The U.S. Supreme
    Court held that these agreements were horizontal in nature. The Supreme Court
    reasoned that, in essence, McKesson, as a dual distributor, competed with each
    of the wholesalers with which it had agreements. Thus, the arrangement was
    horizontal rather than vertical.

    Progressively, following authoritative rulings in
    the U.S., which held that vertical restraints required assessment under the
    rule of reason approach,6
    the trend gradually shifted towards assessing vertical restraints (or at least
    non-price vertical restraints) in dual distribution models under the rule of
    reason approach.7
    In this regard, one of the earliest and most significant cases was Norman E.
    Krehl, et al. v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., et al. (“Baskin Robbins”).8
    Baskin-Robbins had a dual distribution model, whereby it licensed its
    trademarks and formulae to independent ice cream manufacturers (which
    exclusively operated as area franchisors in assigned territories), and also
    operated as an area franchisor itself in certain reserved territories. It was
    held that this arrangement could not be assessed under the per se rule
    in the absence of evidence of collusion between Baskin-Robbins and its area
    franchisors to allocate or fix territories. The Court held that the allocation
    of territories was a unilateral decision by Baskin-Robbins, without any
    coercion or requests by the other area franchisors, and without any hindrance
    to inter-brand competition. Notably, an increase in inter-brand competition was
    a relevant factor in the Court’s assessment. It noted that Baskin-Robbins’
    distribution system had in fact resulted in the expansion of its business to
    new territories and had increased the promotion and availability of its
    products.

    Similar rulings were also given in the context of price-related restraints. For instance, in Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc. (“Jacobs”),9 the defendant (“TPX”) was a mattress manufacturer that sold its products on its own website, but also through third-party distributors. Interestingly, TPX sold the mattresses at the same price as its distributors. It was alleged that TPX had entered into price-fixing agreements with its distributors, containing both vertical and horizontal restraints. It was argued that the restraints completely foreclosed price competition in the downstream market, and that there was barely any price variance between mattresses sold either through third-party distributors’ brick-and-mortar stores or on TPX’s own website.

    In its ruling, the Court held that although TPX (as a dual distributor)
    used vertical minimum resale price agreements, both TPX and its third-party
    distributors nonetheless independently set their own prices. The fact that
    these prices were similar was because TPX’s direct sales (through its website)
    acted as a sort of “enforcement mechanism” to keep a check on prices charged by
    distributors. Thus, if distributors raised their prices above the minimum
    resale price set by TPX, consumers would automatically shift and purchase
    almost exclusively from TPX’s website, thereby driving the distributors out of
    business.

    In the same vein, it was economically advantageous for TPX to sell
    (through its website) at the agreed minimum price, as any
    price reduction would affect its distributors’ business. As such, the
    commercial significance of maintaining distributor showrooms for consumers to
    test the mattresses before purchasing was crucial for TPX to maintain price
    parity. Put another way, the court noted that the allegations raised competing
    inferences of conscious parallelism and independent business judgment/economic
    interest. Given that price parallelism by itself was not sufficient to
    establish horizontal price fixing, the court dismissed the complaint in the
    absence of additional evidence to demonstrate that, somehow, TPX and its
    distributors signaled to each other and coordinated price adjustments.

    The ruling in Jacobs is significant in the context of the
    growing trend for manufacturers to rely on e-commerce channels, given that
    having both a conventional physical store and an online sales channel has now
    become the “new normal.”

    Cartel Risks – How Can
    They Arise?

    While the case law cited above demonstrates a
    progressive trend towards adopting a rule of reason approach in assessing dual distribution restraints,
    the primary dilemma of sorting dual distribution arrangements into the
    “horizontal” and “vertical” categories continues to confound antitrust
    authorities worldwide.

    In 2016, in stark contrast to the case law
    trend analyzed above, the High Court of Australia (“High Court”) in ACCC v.
    Flight Centre Limited
    (“Flight Centre”)10
    held that Flight Centre, a travel agent for international airlines/carriers
    (that offered air ticket booking services to customers) had attempted to
    collude with carriers (dual distributors of air tickets through direct website
    sales) by inducing them not to offer price discounts through their direct sales
    channels. Despite the presence of an agency relationship, the High Court
    observed that Flight Centre and the international carriers operated in the same
    market (i.e. the market for supply of international airline tickets) and
    directly competed with one another. As such, from a consumer perspective, both
    were competitors in the same relevant market, and the attempt to collude on
    price impeded competition.

    To arrive at this conclusion, the High Court
    primarily focused on two crucial aspects: (i) the fact that Flight Centre
    exercised pricing discretion over the tickets it sold to customers; and (ii)
    the scope of the authority given to Flight Centre by the international carriers
    insofar as it was free to act/operate in its own best interests.

    A 2016 consent order by the U.S. Federal Trade
    Commission (“FTC”) involving a dual
    distribution model follows in a similar vein. Fortiline LLC (“Fortiline”), a U.S. ductile iron pipe distributor,11
    was charged with “invitation to collude” with its competitor (a
    manufacturer/dual distributor). In short, Fortiline distributed iron pipes from
    several players including those of a certain company (“Manufacturer “A”), which
    was also a direct distributor in the market. While the FTC recognized the
    importance of market and price-related communications between a manufacturer
    and its distributor(s), it noted that Fortiline’s invitation to collude with
    Manufacturer A was an attempt to fix prices across the board, and therefore
    impeded horizontal competition. As such, any pro-competitive benefits or
    improvement in inter-brand competition emanating from Fortiline’s vertical
    relationship with Manufacturer A could not shield it from a finding of price
    collusion contrary to Section 5 of the U.S. FTC Act.

    Ultimately, the FTC approved a consent
    agreement whereby Fortiline, among other things, was prohibited from entering
    into or soliciting agreements with competing distributors to fix prices or
    allocate markets. The agreement contained an exception permitting
    communications between Fortiline and manufacturers to the extent necessary to
    achieve the pro-competitive benefits of a lawful manufacturer-distributor
    relationship, and for negotiating/entering into sale/purchase agreements.

    These rulings show that antitrust risks in
    dual distribution models depend on the facts, and a case-by-case assessment is required to assess their legality. The
    cases also emphasize that the presence of an agency relationship may not
    necessarily immunize parties from the applicability of antitrust principles if
    the principal and the agent are found to compete in the downstream market.

    The Indian Position

    While there has been no Indian case law thus far dealing specifically
    with the issue of dual distribution, it may be worthwhile to briefly discuss the CCI’s recent
    decision in In Re: Anticompetitive
    conduct in the Dry-Cell Batteries Market in India
    (the “Batteries Case”).12

    Here, the CCI held that Panasonic Energy India Company Limited (“Panasonic India”) and Godrej
    and Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (“Godrej”) (jointly, the “Parties”) were engaged in a price fixing cartel. The
    Parties had entered into a product supply agreement (“PSA”) for institutional sales of dry cell
    batteries from Panasonic India to Godrej, pursuant to which Godrej would
    rebrand the batteries under its own name for resale. The PSA required both
    Parties to maintain price parity between their respective brands, and not to
    jeopardize each other’s market interests. Additionally, the PSA also stipulated
    that both Parties were “independent principals,” and that it did not create a
    joint venture, partnership, or agency agreement. The Parties argued that they
    were not cartelizing, given that the PSA was a supply arrangement and should
    therefore be considered (at most) to be a “vertical” agreement.

    However, the CCI dismissed these arguments,
    and held that the Parties were engaged in a price-fixing cartel. To this end,
    the CCI observed that, from a demand-side perspective, Panasonic’s distribution
    arm and Godrej were in a horizontal relationship and acted as independent
    competitors with separate brands, even though the products were manufactured by
    the same party (i.e. Panasonic India). Therefore, the PSA, which created price
    parity between two different brands, could not be viewed as vertical resale
    price maintenance between a buyer and a seller.

    The Batteries Case is significant, in that the
    CCI arguably “pierced the veil” of an ostensibly vertical relationship by
    examining it as a horizontal agreement based on its substance and intent. The
    distinctive feature of this case is the presence of two separate market-facing
    brands competing with each other, as opposed to a typical dual distribution
    model where the product or brand remains the same – but is merely available to
    consumers via both the manufacturer (directly) and independent distributors.
    However, another school of thought suggests that the CCI’s reasoning in the
    Batteries Case may have muddied the waters by treating a vertical pricing
    restraint as a cartel.

    The Road Ahead

    Today, e-commerce has made it extremely convenient
    for manufacturers to reach out directly to their consumers. Businesses now
    routinely adopt dual-distribution and multi-distribution models where the
    primary manufacturer has a direct presence in the downstream market through
    company-owned outlets, or online channels. This metamorphosis has rendered
    previously straightforward relationships between stakeholders and business
    partners complex. Such redefined roles have also obscured the lens under which
    such relationships were traditionally viewed.

    Based on the evolving jurisprudence, it appears that while engaging in dual distribution in itself is not prohibited, direct competition between a manufacturer and its distribution channels requires scrutiny under competition rules to ascertain the intent behind certain restraints and the true character of seemingly harmless arrangements. Typically, the competition assessment of distribution restraints takes into account the effects of the restraint on inter-brand competition, considering its direct impact on and relevance to consumers. Whether or not the same principle should be extended to intra-brand competition is a material question for dual distribution. Although trends in recent case law suggest that the relationship between a manufacturer and an independent distributor in a dual distribution model is primarily vertical in nature (requiring a rule of reason assessment), there is no bright-line test to govern all types of seemingly innocuous vertical agreements. As such, until clarity is provided by antitrust regulators on the treatment of dual distribution models, it is too soon to foretell their definitive fate. Given the rapidly changing business environment, it is recommended that an assessment of dual- or multi-channel distribution models be undertaken to evaluate the efficiencies and potential threats they present. It is small wonder that an increased number of distribution channels can enhance customer reach and result in tangible efficiencies. That said, lack of sufficient care in entering into such arrangements without an adequate rationale, and without putting in place appropriate safeguards, could compromise their legality, and raise antitrust risks for manufacturers and distributors alike.

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    1 Anisha Chand is a Partner in the
    Competition law practice group of Khaitan & Co., Mumbai. She is reachable
    at anisha.chand@khaitanco.com, and Anmol Awasthi is an
    associate in the Competition law practice group of Khaitan & Co., Mumbai.
    She is reachable at anmol.awasthi@khaitanco.com.

    2 Section 3(3), Competition Act, 2002 (the “Act”).

    3 For example, see Section 19(3) of the Act.

    4 Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U. S. 717 (1988).

    5 351 U.S. 305 (1956).

    6 Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.; 433 U.S. 36, (1977);
    Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877
    (2007).

    7 Red Diamond Supply v. Liquid
    Carbonic Corp.,
    637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.
    1981); H & B Equip. Co. v. Int’l Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 245 (5th
    Cir. 1978).

    8 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982).

    9 626 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2010).

    10 2016 [HCA] 49.

    11 In the Matter of Fortiline, LLC,
    FTC File No. 151 0000, Docket No. C-4592, FTC (September 23, 2016).

    12 Suo motu Case No. 3 of 2017, CCI (January 15, 2019).