This Autumn 2009 issue marks several anniversaries; it is the tenth volume of CPI, the end of our fifth year, and the last issue we will publish in the first decade of the 21st century.
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From the Editor
David Evans, Nov 01, 2009
This Autumn 2009 issue marks several anniversaries; it is the tenth volume of CPI, the end of our fifth year, and the last issue we will publish in the first decade of the 21st century.
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A Symposium on Antitrust and the Global Economic Crisis
Philip Lowe, Nov 01, 2009
Competition policy is one of the tools we need to deploy to help maintain the integrity of the EU single market and to help our economies out of the crisis,
Bruce Lyons, Nov 01, 2009
Why do all the rules of good competition policy appear to fly out of the window when the banks get into trouble?
John Kwoka, Nov 01, 2009
A great debate has emerged over the causes of the auto industry´s collapse, the rationale for government intervention, and the effects of competition between government owned and private auto companies.
Lorenzo Coppi, Jenny Haydock, Nov 01, 2009
In the context of the current economic crisis, this paper discusses the appropriate framework for analyzing aid to the financial sector given under Article 87(3)(b).
Ken Heyer, Sheldon Kimmel, Nov 01, 2009
While it can be hard to evaluate a failing firm defense under the Merger Guidelines, the principles underlying the test are generally sound, even when the overall economy is going through very difficult times.
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A Colloquy on Reverse Payments
Elai Katz, William Rooney, Nov 01, 2009
An overview of the treatment of reverse-payment agreements by the agencies, the appellate courts, Congress, and the European Commission.
Michael Kades, Nov 01, 2009
By adopting an approach without regard to its implications or erroneously suggesting that pay for delay settlements are an ineffective way to delay competition, courts are essentially whistling past the graveyard.
Anne Layne-Farrar, Nov 01, 2009
In tackling reverse payments, should a different policy tact might be called for; one that shifts emphasis from determining whether or not reverse payments should be per se illegal to working with the incentives that firms already face.
Marc van der Waude, Marc van der Waude, Nov 01, 2009
The purpose of this contribution is to explore the status types that settlements and reverse payments could have under Article 81 EC.
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Group Commentary on Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory by Einer Elhauge
Harry First, Nov 01, 2009
I offer some comments on Professor Elhauge´s approach to tying and the importance of the one monopoly profit theory.
Daniel Crane, Joshua Wright, Nov 01, 2009
Since we abhor suspense, we will quickly answer the question our title poses: No. As a general matter, bundled discounting schemes lower prices to consumers unless they are predatory
Barry Nalebuff, Nov 01, 2009
I will focus my attention on one aspect of Einer Elhauge’s presentation, namely the effect of price discrimination via metering and tying on consumer welfare and total welfare
Paul Seabright, Paul Seabright, Nov 11, 2009
Professor Elhauge´s arguments are used to motivate a vision of the priorities for antitrust enforcement that may be seriously misguided if his optimism is unfounded.
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Notable Antitrust Cases
Thomas Kauper, Thomas Kauper, Nov 01, 2009
From the outset the AT&T case presented a host of institutional, regulatory, procedural, and substantive issues that continue to plague antitrust enforcement agencies, courts, and economic policy makers both here and abroad.
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The Classics
Hill Wellford, Nov 01, 2009
Harberger´s 1954 article broke with the then-current economic orthodoxy and set monopoly research on a path that would lead to a strong shift toward empiricism and the development of a more cautious approach for antitrust enforcement.
Arnold Harberger, Arnold Harberger, Nov 01, 2009
This classic 1954 article broke with the then-current economic orthodoxy and set monopoly research on a path that would lead to a strong shift toward empiricism and the development of a more cautious approach for antitrust enforcement.
