Posted by Social Science Research Network
Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership
By José Azar (University of Navarra), Martin C. Schmalz (University of Michigan) & Isabel Tecu
(Charles River Associates)
Abstract: Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of large institutional investors. In the US airline industry, taking common ownership into account implies increases in market concentration that are ten times larger than what is “presumed likely to enhance market power” by antitrust authorities. We find a robust correlation between within-route changes in common ownership concentration and route-level changes in ticket prices, also when we only use variation in ownership due to the combination of two large investors. We conclude that a hidden social cost – reduced product market competition – accompanies the private benefits of diversification and good governance.
Featured News
Polish Regulators Probe PS Store and Steam for Antitrust Violations
May 15, 2024 by
CPI
French Regulator Meat-Cutting Sector Case Following Antitrust Review
May 15, 2024 by
CPI
Arizona Attorney General Files Suit Against Amazon Over Unfair Business Practices
May 15, 2024 by
CPI
Varsity Spirit and Private Equity Owners Settle Class Action Antitrust Suit
May 15, 2024 by
CPI
US Senators Present AI Strategy, Call for Funding Surge
May 15, 2024 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Ecosystems
May 9, 2024 by
CPI
Mapping Antitrust onto Digital Ecosystems
May 9, 2024 by
CPI
Ecosystems and Competition Law: A Law and Political Economy Approach
May 9, 2024 by
CPI
Ecosystem Theories of Harm: What is Beyond the Buzzword?
May 9, 2024 by
CPI
Open Ecosystems: Benefits, Challenges, and Implications for Antitrust
May 9, 2024 by
CPI