Pieter Kalbfleisch, Nov 05, 2010
Would it lead to more effective sanctioning of cartel violations if attention were shifted from sanctioning undertakings to primarily sanctioning those individuals who, de facto, either exercised leadership over or gave instructions to a cartel violation, along with those who refrained from taking any measures to stop the violation, even though they had the power to stop the violation or to prevent it from happening? This article will examine why the answer to this question is both yes and no.
Featured News
Ohio Attorney General Files Antitrust Lawsuit Against Major Cannabis Operators
Feb 8, 2026 by
nhoch@pymnts.com
South Korea Accuses DB Group of Concealing Affiliates to Preserve Family Control
Feb 8, 2026 by
nhoch@pymnts.com
Creditors Seek Dismissal of Optimum’s Antitrust Lawsuit Amid Debt Restructuring Fight
Feb 8, 2026 by
nhoch@pymnts.com
DOJ May Launch Probe Into US Homebuilders as Housing Costs Soar
Feb 8, 2026 by
nhoch@pymnts.com
Israel Antitrust Authority Plans Record Fine Against El Al Over Wartime Airfares
Feb 8, 2026 by
nhoch@pymnts.com
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Hub-&-Spoke Conspiracies
Jan 26, 2026 by
CPI
A Data Analytics Company as the Hub in a Hub-and-Spoke Cartel
Jan 26, 2026 by
Joseph Harrington
Hub and Spoke Cartels
Jan 26, 2026 by
Patrick Van Cayseele
Hub-and-Spoke Collusion or Vertical Exclusion? Identifying the Rim in Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracies
Jan 26, 2026 by
Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Pedro Gonzaga, Laura Ildefonso & Albert Metz
The Algorithmic Middleman in a Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracy: Divergent Court Decisions and the Expanding Patchwork of State and Local Regulations
Jan 26, 2026 by
Bradley C. Weber