Posted by Social Science Research Network
Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power
By Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner, E. Glen Weyl
Recent research indicates that labor market power has contributed to wage inequality and economic stagnation. Although the antitrust laws prohibit firms from restricting competition in labor markets like in product markets, the government does little to address the labor market problem and private litigation has been rare and mostly unsuccessful. The reason is that the analytic methods for evaluating labor market power in antitrust contexts are primitive, far less sophisticated than the legal rules used to judge product market power. To remedy this asymmetry, we propose methods for judging the effects of mergers on labor markets. We also extend our approach to other forms of anticompetitive practices undertaken by employers against workers. We highlight some arguments and evidence indicating that market power may be even more important in labor than in product markets.
Featured News
Croatian Supermarket Chain Tommy Cleared to Acquire Brodokomerc Nova
Oct 13, 2024 by
CPI
X and Unilever Settle Antitrust Dispute, Continuing Partnership
Oct 13, 2024 by
CPI
Federal Judge Allows Antitrust Claims Against GoDaddy to Proceed
Oct 13, 2024 by
CPI
Court Ruling Opens Door for Microsoft to Sell Xbox Games on Android Without Google’s Cut
Oct 13, 2024 by
CPI
Realtors Appeal to Supreme Court Over DOJ’s Investigation into Antitrust Violations
Oct 13, 2024 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Refusal to Deal
Sep 27, 2024 by
CPI
Antitrust’s Refusal-to-Deal Doctrine: The Emperor Has No Clothes
Sep 27, 2024 by
Erik Hovenkamp
Why All Antitrust Claims are Refusal to Deal Claims and What that Means for Policy
Sep 27, 2024 by
Ramsi Woodcock
The Aspen Misadventure
Sep 27, 2024 by
Roger Blair & Holly P. Stidham
Refusal to Deal in Antitrust Law: Evolving Jurisprudence and Business Justifications in the Align Technology Case
Sep 27, 2024 by
Timothy Hsieh