Mariana Tavares de Araujo, Nov 05, 2010
The purpose of this paper is to discuss Ginsburg’s & Wright’s proposal to enhance deterrence of hard-core cartels by shifting sanctions away from corporations towards perpetrators and other responsible individuals; and by specifically including the possibility of debarment as an option of sanction against corporate officers and directors. It is organized as follows. Section II presents data that supports policy decisions by antitrust authorities of prioritizing cartel enforcement. Second III analyzes why enhancing detection methods and adopting severe sanctions against offenders are crucial elements to deter hard-core cartels; I also describe Ginsburg & Wright’s proposal and other views on this issue. Section III examines Brazil’s policy on hard-core cartel enforcement vis a vis Ginsburg’s & Wright’s proposal. Section IV concludes.
Featured News
Biosense Webster Files Motion to Dismiss Antitrust $442M Verdict
Jul 8, 2025 by
CPI
Epic Games Drops Suit Against Samsung in Antitrust Case, Google Remains in Crosshairs
Jul 7, 2025 by
CPI
Former FTC Antitrust Leader Returns to Covington & Burling in Leadership Role
Jul 7, 2025 by
CPI
SEC Issues New Guidance for Disclosing ETPs
Jul 7, 2025 by
CPI
AI Company Buys Bitcoin Miner in $9 Billion Deal to Expand Data Power
Jul 7, 2025 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – eDiscovery & Antitrust
Jun 30, 2025 by
CPI
Off-Channel and Ephemeral Messaging in Antitrust Investigations: Legal Risks, Regulatory Focus, and Ediscovery Challenges
Jun 30, 2025 by
Daniel Rupprecht & Tristan Jenkinson
Encrypted Messaging in the Crosshairs: Compliance, Legal Risks, and Global Perspectives
Jun 30, 2025 by
Corey Bieber & Guillermo Christensen
Ephemeral and Encrypted Messaging: DOJ Expectations, Compliance Risks, and Best Practices
Jun 30, 2025 by
Megan Gerking, Joe Folio, Haydn Forrest & Adrienne Irmer
Antitrust Litigation in the Age of GenAI
Jun 30, 2025 by
Robin Perkins & Tom Gricks