Mariana Tavares de Araujo, Nov 05, 2010
The purpose of this paper is to discuss Ginsburg’s & Wright’s proposal to enhance deterrence of hard-core cartels by shifting sanctions away from corporations towards perpetrators and other responsible individuals; and by specifically including the possibility of debarment as an option of sanction against corporate officers and directors. It is organized as follows. Section II presents data that supports policy decisions by antitrust authorities of prioritizing cartel enforcement. Second III analyzes why enhancing detection methods and adopting severe sanctions against offenders are crucial elements to deter hard-core cartels; I also describe Ginsburg & Wright’s proposal and other views on this issue. Section III examines Brazil’s policy on hard-core cartel enforcement vis a vis Ginsburg’s & Wright’s proposal. Section IV concludes.
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