Economic growth has slowed in many countries, in some cases posing significant long-run threats to national well-being and security. Governments are considering industrial policy to accelerate growth and gain competitive advantages over other countries. Antitrust authorities are looking at how to deal with industrial policy, and governments are looking at how to deal with antitrust authorities. This article makes three observations. First, countries need to balance how much to rely on industrial policies versus markets to drive growth, and that balance should be struck soundly in favor or markets, given the evidence. Second, competition authorities should focus on being vigilant cops on the beat and leave industrial policies to others as much as possible. Third, sound competition policy is based on balancing competing considerations and the circumstances of the country. It could make sense to adjust the balance, or consider a paradigm shift, when there are radical long-term changes in economic circumstances and objectives, such as the “existential crisis” facing Europe.
By David S. Evans[1]
I. Introduction
Starting in the mid 1980s, country after country embraced markets to drive development and growth. For some countries, such as Vietnam, markets and entrepreneurship were largely new. For others, such as Sweden, governments reduced the role of the state in running industries and curtailed regulations. The world’s experiment with strong forms of socialism ended. Markets displaced state planning on a massive scale.
World GDP per capita exploded. It increased from $5,578 per person in 1990 to $22,850 per person in 2023 as shown in Figure 1.[2] The percentage of people living in extreme poverty declined from 39.0 percent in 1989 to 8.1 percent in 2020.[3] The market-driven transformation of China (with more than a billion people) was a significant contributor to these gains.[4]
Figure 1: World GDP Per Capita, 1990-2023[5]
Economic growth and prosperity did not come from “anything-goes” capitalism. Markets don’t work well without rules. Few businesses aspire to the life of low profits and intense rivalry. The desire to escape from competition can drive innovation. Unfortunately, it can also lead businesses to form cartels, merge to monopoly, and stifle competition.
Most countries that embraced markets also adopted competition laws and launched competition authorities. The number of countries with competition authorities increased from about 40 in the mid 1980s to 140 in 2024.[6] The global association of competition authorities (the “ICN”) represents 141 competition authorities from 129 countries.[7] Enforcement of competition laws became more vigorous in many of these countries. Nations recognized that markets, and competition, must have rules, enforcement, and penalties.
These “antitrust cops” are crucial figures in market economies. Like any cop, their success hinges on prevention. Their main contribution is making sure bad stuff does not happen in the first place.
Growth has slowed in many developed countries (including the European Union), as well as developing ones, such as Brazil. Governments are looking to industrial policy to accelerate growth. Some are turning to industrial policy to increase their competitive advantage over other countries whose success they attribute to savvier industrial policies. Sadly, threats of war are palpable, which provide reasons for governments to protect, or create, industries that are vital to national defense and security.[8]
The antitrust cops — and the broader antitrust community — are discussing how to deal with industrial policies. It is a common subject at conferences, and also the subject of papers, blogs, and posts on social media. Yet, at the same time, some jurisdictions, including the UK and EU, are rethinking the role of competition authorities in driving growth and innovation.
This article makes three observations related to these discussions.
- First, countries pursuing growth and innovation should be cautious about how much they rely on industrial policy. Like regulation, industrial policy can make economies more efficient by solving market failures; and, like regulation, industrial policy can suppress market-driven growth and innovation. Now that more countries are recognizing that wrapping markets around the axle with regulations saps growth, it would be a mistake to wrap them around the axle with industrial policies.
- Second, competition authorities should focus on being vigilant cops on the beat. They should leave industrial policies to others. The lines between competition and industrial policy are not always bright so there are doubtless exceptions. Competition authorities can also caution against adopting industrial policies that could reduce economic growth by suppressing competition.
- Third, markets work more efficiently when antitrust policy is stable and predictable. That enables businesses to better plan investments and assess risks. However, sound policy is based on balancing competing considerations and the circumstances of the country, not on immutable laws. It could make sense to adjust the balance, or consider a paradigm shift, when there are radical long-term changes in economic circumstances and objectives. That is the subject of discussion in Europe following the release of the Draghi Report in September 2024 and his alarming prediction that the continent needs radical change for “self-preservation.”[9]
II. Industrial Policy and the Goldilocks Rule
“Kaput.”
That’s the title of Wolfgang Munchau’s book on the “end of the German miracle.”[10] German industrial policy bet on automobiles and mechanical engineering. It was great, until it wasn’t. Germany’s national champions are in decline largely because of disruptive innovation in the U.S. and China.
Germany did not bet on digital. Meanwhile multiple waves of the digital revolution have bypassed the largest economy in Europe over three decades.
There isn’t much disagreement on the ground that Germany faces a serious challenge to its continued prosperity and position in the world. The German government is urgently figuring out what to do.
A. Industrial Policy Works in Theory
Industrial policy is one of many government policies that promote economic growth.
Horizontal policies cut across industries. These include intellectual property law, competition policy, and property and contract law. Horizontal policy also includes government funding of basic research and development.
Vertical policies focus on promoting certain industries, including the creation of new ones, targeted research funding, as well as regulation of industry. Much of the debate over industrial policy concerns vertical initiatives — ones that target a specific industry or sector. Industrial policy may focus on collections of industries that are related to a common objective such as national defense. For the following discussion industrial policy refers to industry or sector specific policy.[11]
Economists have shown that industrial policy can work in theory. Markets do not always promote economic welfare or as much as they should. There are several well-known “market failures.”
- Coordination failures. Businesses provide complementary products. There may be situations where a system of products cannot deliver any value without the necessary complements or as much value if it could with important complements. The market may fail to provide complements that are interoperable with each other or may fail to create important complements at all.
- Agglomeration failures. Businesses may benefit from locating near each other. That could reduce transactions costs, help create a more liquid market for high-skill jobs or provide spillovers in knowledge across employees and firms. A type of coordination failure could arise where businesses would be better off collectively by co-locating but do not choose to do so individually.
- Positive externalities. Businesses, and their employees, can generate positive externalities that other businesses benefit from. Intellectual property rights do not cover basic ideas for businesses. Entrepreneurs who prove there is market for a new product or service will attract more firms. It is possible that the profits from being an early mover isn’t sufficient to get the market off the ground. This category also includes positive externalities that benefit society at large such as industries that have important spillovers for national security.
- Infrastructure and public goods. There may be situations where one or more industries depends on the existence of an infrastructure that the government could provide more efficiently than private actors or that markets would not provide at all. These usually stem from coordination failures but are worth noting separately.
Free markets can solve some of these “failures” with little if any government involvement. Numerous standard-setting organizations, such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board, have arisen that deal with coordination and externality issues.[12] Agglomeration happens naturally, such as with Shenzhen in China. The 19th century world had privately operated interoperable telegraph networks spanning the world. Private companies have wired the 21st century globe with interoperable fixed and mobile broadband.
The question is whether the government could address some market failures more efficiently than private actors, and whether governments generate net social benefits from being more proactive in doing so.
B. Industrial Policy May Not Work in Practice
Despite the theory, a number of things could go wrong.
The market failure identified is a false positive. That could be a simple logical mistake, or an analysis based on faulty evidence. There could be great uncertainty about how a market would evolve, including complex systems, or the ability of industrial policy to achieve a better outcome.
Special interests can push industrial policy that benefits them, not society. This can happen in democratic systems. The benefits of industrial policy are concentrated in a few who have the incentive to lobby for it. The costs are diffuse or unknown for most voters.
Governments, like any institution, aren’t always adept. The government may fail to execute a policy that solves the market failure and may cause problems that reduce economic welfare. It is harder in practice for the government than markets and private businesses to reverse course to minimize the harm from bad choices.
Identifying market failures and devising policies to correct them usually require policymakers to predict the future or assume that the future is the same as the present. France had much of its populace online in the 1980s due to launching its domestic Minitel service. It was never adopted outside of France. Meanwhile the U.S. government invested in ARPANET which led to the commercial internet, globally.
Any government that adopts industrial policies will make mistakes. This litany of problems is not a basis to reject an initiative. The practical issue is whether the government can do enough industrial policy that generates social benefits to outweigh the social cost of mistakes.
C. Economic Studies Provide Mixed Evidence that Industrial Policy Works in Practice
Professors Juhász, Lane & Rodrik have an excellent comprehensive survey of the new empirical literature on industrial policy. Recent studies are based on more careful econometric analysis than earlier ones and attempt to identify causal effects.
The literature is in its early days. Most of the studies examine whether the justification for a particular intervention is valid. Some assess the effect of the intervention over long time periods. A few of the studies are based on exogenous events that favored an industry such as the impact of the Napoleonic blockade on French cotton spinners. The studies to date cannot establish whether interventions caused an increase in social welfare, only whether they were capable of doing so.[13]
The empirical studies have mixed results, although many have found support that there is an economic justification for an intervention. The authors conclude that:
To us, a balanced reading of the emerging literature suggests that it is no longer possible to dismiss industrial policy as ineffective or counter-productive. In stylized environments where industry policy comes about “by accident,” we have seen the potential for long-lasting, transformational local effects. Put differently, the market failures that justify its use seem large. This should fill us with concern as the current [industrial policy] literature is mostly far too removed from the real world to inform policymaking in any serious way.[14]
That is a well-deserved call for economists to study industrial policy systematically and not to dismiss it out of hand.[15] It is not a ringing endorsement of industrial policy.
D. Industrial Policy in Practice Is Widespread
Professors Juhász, Lane & Rodrik begin their paper noting that, “There are few economic policies that generate more kneejerk opposition from economists than industrial policy.” Professor Tirole asks, “[w]ith such solid arguments [for it], why are most economists wary of industrial policy.”[16] He attributes the litany of failures in France to “a mix of hubris, capture, protectionism and just very poor information.”
The easiest way to get this kneejerk reaction is to use the phrase industrial policy and talk about national champions. The industrial policy debate tends to focus on the big initiatives like China subsidizing EVs or the European Union creating Airbus.
In fact, governments adopt many policies that are targeted at solving perceived problems in domestic industries or to promote new ones. Like regulation, many of these are not controversial and some look sensible ex post.
The U.S. relies on free markets more than most countries. Yet federal, state, and local governments regularly adopt vertical policies. These range from big initiatives such as the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 that was responsible for creating generic competition in the pharmaceutical industry to small ones such as the City of Boston’s investments in Seaport, a new tech hub in the dilapidated waterfront, in the early 2000s.
A small Congressional grant in March 1843 helped ignite the telegraph industry, and the Federal Highway Act of 1956 created the multistate highway system which greatly benefited the automobile industry. The U.S. has subsidized space exploration for a long time.
Of course, the U.S. government subsidized the development of what became the commercial internet after many years. More controversially, the U.S. Congress adopted Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 which was a boon to platforms with third-party content because it shielded them from liability.
E. Goldilocks Rules
The algorithm for assessing proposed government interventions in markets, including industrial, has been well known for decades. Is there a market failure? Are the expected benefits from addressing that market failure, with the tools available, greater than the expected costs? Are there possible unintended consequences that should be factored into those expected costs and that could be avoided through better design?
This algorithm is the basis for the U.S. policy that subjects proposed regulations to a “cost-benefit test.” Professor Cass Sunstein has referred to this as the “economic constitution of the United States.”[17] The European Union 2021 Better Regulation legislation incorporates cost-benefit analysis as well.[18]
Like regulation, industrial policy is just another response to market failure, and policymakers can apply this algorithm to it. Professor Tirole has proposed an eight-step program for tailoring a cost-benefit algorithm to industrial policy. When applied to proposed policies, the cost-benefit algorithm will necessarily result in false positives and false negatives.
An overarching question for countries is the extent to which they should rely on industrial policies versus markets. Countries that are more prone to use these policies will consider and implement more. Even if cost-benefit analysis is applied rigorously, industrial-policy prone countries will adopt more policies and rely on markets less.
Countries tend to decide at a high level whether they want to intervene in markets more and then consider policies to do that. They could base this decision on maximizing long-run expected social welfare. They can apply the Goldilocks Rule — not too little, not too much, but just right. The implementation of the rule depends on facts, and facts vary across countries, and over time. The optimal balance will lead to different dependencies on industrial policy based on the circumstances of the country.[19]
That said, there is strong evidence for relying on markets to drive growth and innovation and not for tilting towards significant use of industrial policy. Competition authorities should bear this in mind.
F. Chinese Lessons
It is an extreme case, and industrial policy is only part of the story, but China provides some lessons.
China veered from using mainly industrial planning prior to the Deng reforms in 1978 to increasing reliance on markets. This stimulated massive economic growth. It pulled hundreds of millions of people from deep poverty. And it created world-class Chinese companies that were not state owned.
Starting in the mid 2010s, under Chairman Xi, China shifted its emphasis toward state-owned enterprises and industrial planning and away from free markets. It has not gone well. By the end of 2024, China’s growth had slowed considerably, domestic consumption was weak, and it was widely understood that the country faced serious long-term economic challenges, accentuated by sharply declining population.
During 2024, the Chinese government revived encouraging private business, investment, and entrepreneurs to stimulate growth. There was a stunning affirmation of the importance of private enterprise for innovation in January 2025. DeepSeek unveiled its pioneering large language model and became a national champion in AI. A few weeks later, Chairman Xi held “peace talks” with the Chinese Big Tech firms which had been the crown jewels market reforms.
Advocates for industrial policy may point to the success of the Chinese EV industry. The leading companies such as BYD are private companies started by entrepreneurs. But the Chinese government has poured hundreds of billions of dollars of subsidies into the car and battery makers. This has been a massive success for global consumers who are getting cheap high quality EVs from China. It has been a major problem for EU automakers, but it has not helped the Chinese economy.
China and Germany both ended up staring at economic crises by 2024.
III. Competition Policy in the Time of Economic Crisis
Modern competition law and policy reflects legislative, court, and enforcement decisions to defer to market forces rather than intervene in most business decisions. Competition authorities referee the game of competition. They call out fouls and, and when necessary, impose penalties or restrictive orders.
Competition policy in most countries does not prevent firms from obtaining or having market power, including monopoly power, or becoming big and important, organically. Firms must just behave themselves on their path to whatever success they achieve and as they participate in markets.
Implicitly, competition policy relies on dynamic competition among firms to advance economic progress. That is particularly important when economic progress is driven by innovation and the diffusion of new technologies. Within this broad framework, countries may be more or less stringent, so that conduct that might be allowed in some countries, may not be in others. There is a tendency, however, for commentators to exaggerate the differences and ignore the consistency.
Competition policy works in concert with many other policies, including intellectual property, sectoral regulation, taxation, social welfare and employment, trade, and others to promote economic progress and address societal concerns. As in most activities, it makes sense for each of these policies to specialize and work together rather than for each policy to achieve many or all objectives. Economists have shown that it is challenging and may be counterproductive for policies, or agencies, to pursue multiple competing objectives.[20]
Competition authorities in complex economies typically have a big job and spare resources for accomplishing it. They should focus on being antitrust cops. There is always lots to do.
That’s not the end of the story, though.
A. Optimal Antitrust Policy Depends on the Circumstances for a Country
It is useful to think of the design of antitrust rules as the solution of an optimal control problem under uncertainty.[21] The country is maximizing long-run social welfare recognizing that enforcement of rules will lead to false positive and false negative outcomes. The optimal control could include other objectives in addition to long-run social welfare but the rules that countries have adopted are consistent with that being the main objective.
The optimal policy depends on national circumstances. A country with a history of cartel-like behavior could decide to have more stringent rules than one with an entrepreneurial culture. A country that lacks a sophisticated well-funded judicial system might find that it is optimal to have bright-line rules.
It is likely that the optimal antitrust policy should remain stable even if some of the underlying inputs into the optimal control problem change. That is because increasing uncertainty for businesses by changing the policy frequently would reduce investment in growth and innovation.
Drastic changes in inputs or in the objectives, however, could make it desirable to reconsider the competition rules and the role of the competition authority.
B. Europe’s Existential Crisis and Competition Policy
The EU, most of its Member States, and the UK faced the same problems at the end of 2024.[22] Economic growth had slowed, labor productivity was low, private investment in transformative technologies was low, and innovation was lacking. The disparity in GDP per capita with the U.S. was large and widening. The gap in innovation with the U.S. and China was wide. It was not a global player in AI. And then the European automobile industry went into a tailspin.
Europe faces decline with a sluggish economy, fewer working age people to support an expanding older population, and the need to raise spending on defense.[23]
Mario Draghi, an economist, head of the ECB during the great recession, and former Prime Minister of Italy was asked to prepare a report on Europe’s competitiveness.[24] He concluded that the EU faces an “existential crisis.” This term is commonly used by EU officials and others to describe the situation. It means that Europe risks losing its way of life and relevance in the world. EC-commissioned studies have warned this day would come for decades, and now it has.
That’s enough to consider a long-term change in competition law and enforcement.
Draghi does not call for radical reform. He endorses Tirole’s view that “what is needed is not a drastic change in antitrust law.” Draghi recommends, however, that “competition authorities need to be more forward-looking and agile.” That includes emphasizing “the weight of innovation and future competition in DG-COMP decisions.” It also means recognizing that innovation may require scale. DG-COMP should be more receptive to cross-border mergers, particularly in telecoms, where Draghi sees the need for a large EU player to compete on the world stage.[25]
If DG-COMP and the EU courts indeed placed decisive weight on dynamic competition and scale, these recommendations would lead to a drastic departure from the ordo-liberal tradition and merits-based competition. It is not clear that is in the plans. The Commission’s Competitiveness Compass roadmap,[26] which is working its way through the legislative process, echoes some of Draghi’s recommendations, but it is unclear they would have much effect in practice. Meanwhile, the Commission’s proposed guidelines on exclusionary abuses, which were released a month before Draghi’s report, emphasize merits-based competition and deemphasize the modern effects-based approach to competition policy.[27] It is hard to see how a serious analysis of long-run economic growth and innovation fits in.
IV. Striking the Right Balancing Between Markets, Industrial Policy, and Antitrust
The Draghi Report argues that oppressive regulation is a substantial barrier to innovation in Europe. He concludes that “we are failing to translate innovation into commercialisation, and innovative companies that want to scale up in Europe are hindered at every stage by inconsistent and restrictive regulations.” This is particularly onerous in the tech sector. The Report finds that the EU has around 100 tech-focused laws and over 270 regulators active in the digital sector across the EU. The sweeping regulations reflect a long-standing entrenched distrust of free markets.
As part of its Competitiveness Compass, the Commission “aims at reducing drastically the regulatory and administrative burden.”[28] It remains to be seen whether the EU will move toward a greater reliance on markets or end up replacing fewer regulations with more industrial policies.
It would be easy if we had a sound playbook for devising industrial policies that were likely to maximize long-run economic growth and well-being, or if we could dismiss industrial policy as a fool’s errand. We do not. There are strong reasons, however, to use industrial policy sparingly and to rely on markets subject to sensible rules and vigilant antitrust cops.
Click here for the full article.
[1] Chairman, Market Platform Dynamics and Managing Director, Berkeley Research Group. For more details on me, including my books and articles, see davidsevans.org. I have been an advisor to and investor in digital businesses, particularly startups, and an economic expert in litigation and investigations, on behalf of government authorities and private plaintiffs, in the United States, the European Union, China, and other countries.
[2] Adjusted for purchasing power parity in current dollars. GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), World Bank Group, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD.
[3] Nishant Yonzan et. al., Estimates of global poverty from WWII to the fall of the Berlin Wall, WORLD BANK BLOGS (November 23, 2022), https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/opendata/estimates-global-poverty-wwii-fall-berlin-wall.
[4] GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2021 international $) – China, WORLD BANK GROUP, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD?locations=CN.
[5] GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), WORLD BANK GROUP, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD.
[6] The United Nations Set of Principles and Rules on Competition: implementation after 40 years, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (February 2025), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditcclp2024d2_en.pdf.
[7] Press Release, Competition and Markets Authority, CMA to Host 2025 International Competition Network Conference (May 17, 2024), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-to-host-2025-international-competition-network-conference.
[8] These statements were true before the recent forays into trade wars and will likely continue to be true regardless of how those play out.
[9] The Draghi Report on EU Competitiveness, European Commission (September 9, 2024), https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en. European Economy Faces ‘Existential Challenge,’ Draghi Report Says, Le Monde (September 9, 2024), https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/09/09/european-economy-reportedly-faces-existential-challenge_6725363_4.html.
[10] Wolfgang Munchau, Kaput: The End of the German Miracle (2024).
[11] Lane et al have a broader definition: “We defined industrial policies as those government policies that explicitly target the transformation of the structure of economic activity in pursuit of some public goal.” Réka Juhász, Nathan Lane & Dani Rodrik, The New Economics of Industrial Policy (NBER, Working Paper No. 31538, 2023). Juhász, Réka and Lane, Nathaniel and Rodrik, Dani, The New Economics of Industrial Policy (August 2023). NBER Working Paper No. w31538, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4533252.
[12] See for example, Elinor Olstrom, Governing The Commons: The Evolution Of Institutions For Collective Action (1990). Field, B. C. (1992). [Review of Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, by E. Ostrom]. Land Economics, 68(3), 354–357. https://doi.org/10.2307/3146384.
[13] As the authors put it, “it is important to bear in mind that most of the outcomes we discuss here are a necessary but in themselves insufficient building block of a full efficiency evaluation, which requires a model.” Réka Juhász, Nathan Lane & Dani Rodrik, The New Economics of Industrial Policy (NBER, Working Paper No. 31538, 2023), p. 19.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Even when industrial policy seems to work, it is hard to know whether the outcome is better overall than what would have happened in the alternative. Germany is an example. It had a good run as a manufacturer and exporter of automobiles. It ended with policymakers and commentators highly pessimistic about the country’s economic future. It is unknowable whether a more hands-off policy would have resulted in a better long-term outcome.
[16] Jean Tirole, Competition and industrial policy in the 21st century, 3 Oxford Open Economics S1, i983-i1001 (2024), p. i994.
[17] Cass R. Sunstein, The Economic Constitution of the United States, 38 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 2, 25-42 (2024).
[18] Better Regulation Guidelines, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (November 3, 2021), https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/d0bbd77f-bee5-4ee5-b5c4-6110c7605476_en?filename=swd2021_305_en.pdf.
[19] David S. Evans, Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules, Chicago Journal Of International Law, Forthcoming (2009).
[20] For instance, economists have found that central banks that are less independent — that is, pursue political objectives other than minimizing inflation – are less effective at minimizing inflation. See e.g. Alberto Alesina & Roberta Gatti “Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost,” American Economic Review, May 1995, 85(2) 196–200; See also Jeffrey Clemens & Benedic Ippolito, “Uncompensated Care and the Collapse of Hospital Payment Regulation: An Illustration of the Tinbergen Rule,” Public Finance Review 47, no. 6 (2019): 1002–1041.
[21] David S. Evans, Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules, CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009).
[22] There’s no need to venture into 2025 for the following discussion.
[23] David S. Evans, Why Can’t Europe Create Digital Businesses? (2024), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4781503.
[24] Mario Draghi, The future of European competitiveness – Part A | A competitiveness strategy for Europe, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (September 2024). Mario Draghi, The future of European competitiveness – Part B | In-depth analysis and recommendations, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (September 2024).
[25] Draghi also says that enforcement should consider “security, resilience, and the related disruption risks to the EU economy” but a separate body should provide that assessment as an input on the public interest. He cautions that DG-COMP should consider the impact of enforcing the Digital Markets Act and Foreign Subsidies Regulation on “the reduced appetite of multinational companies to invest in Europe and the delayed development of technological advances.” He advocates market investigations to address and solve structural competition issues but would limit its remit to a few areas such as “markets where economic resilience is weak.”
[26] A Competitiveness Compass for the EU, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (January 29, 2025), https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/10017eb1-4722-4333-add2-e0ed18105a34_en?filename=Communication_1.pdf.
[27] A Competitiveness Compass for the EU, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (January 29, 2025), https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/10017eb1-4722-4333-add2-e0ed18105a34_en?filename=Communication_1.pdf.
[28] Press Release, European Commission, An EU Compass to Regain Competitiveness and Secure Sustainable Prosperity (January 28, 2025), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_339.