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Introduction of Leniency Programs for Cartel Participants: The Russian Case

BY | August 30, 2011

Svetlana Avdasheva, Andrey Shastitko, Aug 30, 2011 Collusion of market participants is one of the most dangerous forms of restriction of competition, adversely affecting incentives and, as a consequence, allocation…

Svetlana Avdasheva, Andrey Shastitko, Aug 30, 2011

Collusion of market participants is one of the most dangerous forms of restriction of competition, adversely affecting incentives and, as a consequence, allocation and production efficiencies. According to some estimates, the average price rise under price-fixing is 10 percent ; several studies give even higher estimates. For example, according to Connor & Bolotova, the median cartel overcharge over the competitive price is 25 percent, and

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