Vaughn Walker, Apr 30, 2009
I do not argue here that concern about judicial competence regarding complex economic evidence is without substance. Nor do I contend that mergers are best committed in the final analysis to generalist judicial officers who lack expertise in issues of industrial organization although, as will be noted, this provides some check against complete capture of merger policy for purely political purposes. Rather, accepting that in the United States we have committed important decisions about mergers to generalist judges, I argue that a judge´s task in a merger case does not entail recondite analysis. Rather, the judge´s task is less one of economic learning than it is of using the economic analysis to bring the evidence into sufficient focus to reach a decision.
Featured News
EU Regulators Escalate Pressure on US Tech Giants
May 3, 2026 by
CPI
Spirit Airlines Ceases Operations After Rescue Talks With White House Collapse
May 3, 2026 by
CPI
Pentagon Taps Seven AI Firms for Classified Networks
May 3, 2026 by
CPI
Subscribers Sue to Challenge Proposed Paramount-Skydance and Warner Bros. Merger
May 3, 2026 by
CPI
US Antitrust Authorities Complete Review of Intel’s SambaNova Investment
May 3, 2026 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Unilateral Effects
Apr 28, 2026 by
CPI
A Net Present Value Approach to Merger Analysis
Apr 28, 2026 by
Joseph J Simons & Malcolm Coate
Generative AI and Competitive Disruption: Increasingly Relevant for Merger Analysis?
Apr 28, 2026 by
Andrea Coscelli, Emily Chissell, Nitika Bagaria & Tega Akati-Udi
Non-Price Unilateral Effects In Media Mergers
Apr 28, 2026 by
Lapo Filistrucchi & Teresa Oriani
Ecosystem Mergers and Unilateral Effects? A Framework for Assessing the Ecosystem Theory of Harm
Apr 28, 2026 by
Ethel Fonseca, George Tucker & Helder Vasconcelos