Posted by Social Science Research Network
Political Influence and Merger Antitrust Reviews
By Mihir N. Mehta (University of Michigan), Suraj Srinivasan (Harvard) & Wanli Zhao (Southern Illinois University)
Abstract: We document that firms linked to powerful US politicians that oversee merger antitrust regulators receive favorable mergers and acquisition antitrust review outcomes. When acquirers are constituents of these politicians, mergers are likely to encounter a more favorable review process. In contrast, when targets are constituents, the merger antitrust review outcomes are dependent on the target’s partiality towards the merger. To establish identification, we exploit a subset of politician turnover events that are plausibly exogenous as well as a falsification test using politicians with no jurisdiction over antitrust regulators. Politician incentives to influence merger antitrust review outcomes appear to be driven by lobbying, contributions, and prior business connections. Our findings suggest that merger antitrust reviews are not independent of self-serving political intervention.
Featured News
T-Mobile Faces Class-Action Lawsuit Over Sprint Merger After Appeal Denied
May 16, 2024 by
CPI
Google Faces Backlash Over Introduction of AI-Generated Summaries in Searches
May 16, 2024 by
CPI
CMA Launches Phase 2 Probe into AlphaTheta’s Acquisition of Serato
May 16, 2024 by
CPI
NFL Executive Escapes Testifying in High-Stakes Trial Over Televised Games
May 16, 2024 by
CPI
EU Consumers Lodge Complaint Against Chinese Retailer Temu Over Content Rules Breach
May 16, 2024 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Ecosystems
May 9, 2024 by
CPI
Mapping Antitrust onto Digital Ecosystems
May 9, 2024 by
CPI
Ecosystems and Competition Law: A Law and Political Economy Approach
May 9, 2024 by
CPI
Ecosystem Theories of Harm: What is Beyond the Buzzword?
May 9, 2024 by
CPI
Open Ecosystems: Benefits, Challenges, and Implications for Antitrust
May 9, 2024 by
CPI