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Self-Preferencing Isn’t a Sin. It’s Often the Way Competition Works.

 |  September 15, 2025

By: Brian Albrecht & Geoffrey A. Manne (Truth On The Market)

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    In this piece, authors Brian Albrecht & Geoffrey A. Manne (Truth On The Market) take a dive into France’s 2025 push to regulate “autopréférence,” or self-preferencing, in digital markets. The Autorité de la Concurrence launched a public consultation under a new law aimed at cloud-computing providers, asking for examples of favoritism toward their own services and suggestions for curbing it. While this initiative seeks to address perceived harms, the authors caution that economic evidence does not support a blanket presumption of illegality. Self-preferencing, they argue, is essentially a form of vertical integration that can generate efficiencies, expand markets, and often benefit consumers rather than harm them.

    The authors point to multiple cases where integration spurred broader market growth—such as Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram, Google’s development of Photos, and Amazon’s private-label products. Recent empirical studies of Amazon’s search rankings confirm that while its branded items receive a modest boost, this does not necessarily translate into consumer harm. In fact, when Amazon’s products are removed in simulations, overall consumer welfare declines in most categories, with higher prices and fewer reviews for alternatives. The evidence suggests that the effects of self-preferencing are heterogeneous: sometimes neutral or even slightly negative, but often positive, especially in categories where Amazon’s logistics or brand signals improve quality and affordability.

    Even regulators acknowledge these tradeoffs. The FTC’s complaint against Amazon concedes that its Fulfilment-by-Amazon network delivers faster, cheaper shipping nationwide—benefits inherently tied to vertical integration and scale. Limiting these efficiencies in the name of neutrality could reduce consumer welfare, undermining the very goals of antitrust enforcement. Albrecht and Manne go on to argue that self-preferencing is not inherently harmful and should not be treated as presumptively illegal. A French rule that starts from that presumption risks banning pro-competitive practices outright or creating so many exceptions that the rule collapses under its own weight…

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