George Stigler, Nov 05, 2010
No one has the right, and few the ability, to lure economists into reading another article on oligopoly theory without some advance indication of its alleged contribution. The present paper accepts the hypothesis that oligopolists wish to collude to maximize joint profits. It seeks to reconcile this wish with facts, such as that collusion is impossible for many firms and collusion is much more effective in some circumstances than in others. The reconciliation is found in the problem of policing a collusive agreement, which proves to be a problem in the theory of information. A considerable number of implications of the theory are discussed, and a modest amount of empirical evidence is presented.
Featured News
Meta Ordered to Grant Rival AI Chatbots Free WhatsApp Access During EU Antitrust Probe
Jun 9, 2026 by
CPI
Former DOJ Antitrust Leaders Criticize Live Nation Settlement After Trial’s Abrupt End
Jun 9, 2026 by
CPI
Musicians Union Takes Warner and Universal to Court Over AI Training Rights
Jun 9, 2026 by
CPI
Massachusetts Lawmakers Unanimously Pass Comprehensive Privacy Protections
Jun 9, 2026 by
CPI
Nuvei Nears $2.7 Billion Deal to Acquire Payoneer, Sources Say
Jun 9, 2026 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – (Geo)Political Antitrust
May 28, 2026 by
CPI
Competition Policy in Turbulent Geopolitical Times
May 28, 2026 by
Christophe Carugati & Annabelle Gawer
The New Political Determinants of U.S. Antitrust Policy
May 28, 2026 by
Aziz Z. Huq
The Geopolitical Rewiring of Antitrust
May 28, 2026 by
Hayane C. Dahmen
Three Strikes Against Political Antitrust
May 28, 2026 by
Nolan McCarty & Sepehr Shahshahani