Margaret Levenstein, Valerie Suslow, Nov 05, 2010
Antitrust authorities around the world have continued to pursue illegal price-fixing throughout the economic crisis, but have also increasingly granted “inability to pay” reductions in fines. While taking ability to pay into account is appropriate, as the overriding policy goal is the promotion of competition, these reductions in fines must be accompanied by other policy changes in order to maintain the expected level of sanction. Granting inability to pay requests for reductions in fines is an ex-post decision on the part of antitrust authorities, and yet it clearly has ex-ante incentive implications for cartel formation. These fine reductions also have the potential to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the antitrust authorities, and therefore must be implemented with specific, objective, and transparent criteria. To assure the effectiveness of anti-cartel policy, we should design policies that are informed by empirical research.
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