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Interlocking Directorates and Anti-Competitive Risks: An Enforcement Gap in Europe?

By  |  July 13, 2016

Posted by Social Science Research Network

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    Interlocking Directorates and Anti-Competitive Risks: An Enforcement Gap in Europe?

    Florence Thépot, Florian Hugon & Mathieu Luinaud (Droit & Croissance)
    Abstract:       Interlocking directorates between competitors may raise significant anti-competitive risks, which attract little attention in comparison to that posed by other structural links, such as minority shareholdings. This article provides a systematic analysis of the ability of current legal tools of competition law, as well as of company law and corporate governance to address those anti-competitive risks, and thereby, highlights the existence of an enforcement gap in Europe.