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The Anti-Competitive Effects of Minority Stake Acquisitions

By  |  January 9, 2013

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

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    Amrita Nain (University of Iowa – Henry B. Tippie College of Business) and Yan Wang (McGill University – Faculty of Management) discuss The Anti-Competitive Effects of Minority Stake Acquisitions

    ABSTRACT: We show that partial equity ownership of rival firms is driven by competitive considerations and has significant anticompetitive effects. Firms in competitive industries are more likely to acquire a minority stake in a rival firm’s equity. Moreover, minority sake acquisitions are followed by higher output prices and higher price-cost margins, particularly in industries with high barriers to entry. The increase in prices and profit margins is larger when the acquirer and target have a larger market share and when the percentage of shares acquired is higher. Our results suggest that passive investments in rival firms deserve antitrust scrutiny.