Ken Heyer, Nov 01, 2006
The author argues for using the total welfare standard, rather than the more commonly employed consumer welfare standard. In doing so, Heyer responds to three broad objections that have been raised. One is that use of a total welfare standard conflicts with antitrust law, or at least with legal precedent. A second is that employing a total welfare standard would clearly be more costly for antitrust agencies than employing one or another flavor of a consumer welfare standard. A third is that the total welfare standard ignores important distributional considerations considerations that are better treated under some form of consumer welfare standard. Each of these objections is evaluated, and ultimately found unpersuasive.
Featured News
NY Laws Requires Disclosure of AI Actors in Ads, Limit Use of Person’s Image After Death
Dec 12, 2025 by
CPI
Three More States to Throw the Switch on Comprehensive Privacy Rules in 2026.
Dec 12, 2025 by
CPI
Dozens of State AGs Demand AI Companies Fix ‘Delusion’ Outputs by Chatbots
Dec 11, 2025 by
CPI
Texas Sues Epic Systems, Accusing Health-Tech Giant of Anticompetitive Data Practices
Dec 11, 2025 by
CPI
Court Affirms Apple Injunction but Trims Limits in Epic Dispute
Dec 11, 2025 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Acqui-hiring
Dec 11, 2025 by
CPI
Anticompetitive Effects of Acquihires: Labor and Product Markets
Dec 11, 2025 by
Heski Bar-Isaac, Justin Johnson & Volker Nocke
Acquihires In the Technology Sector: Antitrust Scrutiny Through the Lens of Economics
Dec 11, 2025 by
Juliette Caminade, Rebecca Kirk Fair, Zsolt Udvari & Jeanne Vellard Smith
M&A in the AI Era: Considerations for Acquihiring
Dec 11, 2025 by
Ingrid Vandenborre, Kenneth Schwartz, Christopher Barlow, Page Griffin, Michael Cardella, Stuart Levi, Taylor Votek, Benjamin Salzer, Lisa G. Liu & Liz Kraus
Lock Them Up, or Take No Prisoners? Merger Policy and Acquiring AI Talent: Human Rights and Other Inconvenient Facts
Dec 11, 2025 by
Simon R. Pritchard