State ownership has re-emerged as a pivotal element in global industrial policy, particularly in the context of strategic autonomy and sustainability transitions. In this paper, I systematically examine the anticompetitive risks associated with the increased presence of State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”) in mixed markets. By drawing on industrial organization and competition policy literature, as well as EU enforcement practice, I offer a comprehensive risk assessment of SOEs involved in collusion and abuse of dominance (monopolization). I find that notwithstanding telling examples of cartel enforcement against SOEs, the literature supports that SOEs either form welfare-enhancing cartels, or deter collusion by private firms altogether. At the same time clear patterns from enforcement practice emerge of SOEs with a statutory monopoly abusing their dominance, however, without enough guidance from the literature. More theoretical and empirical research on the incentives and likelihood of abuse of dominance by SOEs is therefore urgently needed.
By Jasper P. Sluijs[1]
I. Introduction
State ownership has made a remarkable comeback as a driver for industrial policy around the world, particularly in the nexus of strategic autonomy and sustainability transitions.[2] For example, the British government nationalized its electricity grid operator in 2024, to boost both energy security and accelerate energy transition.[3] Both Chile and Mexico, moreover, nationalized their lithium extraction market in 2023 to safeguard access to this rare earth minerals while ensuring environmentally and socially-conscious mining.[4] Furthermore, Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”) are regarded as actors of Chinese geopolitical industrial policy,[5] as well as drivers of energy transition.[6] Finally, the US, not exactly known as friendly to state ownership, boasts over 2000 energy companies owned by (local) governments,[7] the potential of which has been recognized as a drivers for energy independence and clean energy policy.[8]
The promise of state ownership as a part of (green) industrial policy is intuitively compelling. At the same time, with this potential may come an increased presence of SOEs on markets, with effects on competition between state-owned and private firms. In fact, anticompetitive behavior by SOEs has been mentioned as a risk of increased state ownership,[9] with some authors arguing that SOEs are more likely than private firms to behave anticompetitively.[10]
A coherent risk assessment of anticompetitive effects of resurgent state ownership as part of industrial policy, however, is altogether lacking. This article, therefore, systematically analyzes actual and potential anticompetitive effects of increased state ownership, by drawing on literatures in industrial organization and competition policy, as well as enforcement practice in mainly the EU. To start, I will offer a primer on state ownership and cover insights from research on mixed markets, where SOEs and private firms compete. This will set the stage for a risk assessment of anticompetitive behavior by SOEs. To this effect I will discuss the manifestation and prevalence of both collusion in markets with SOEs and abuse of dominance (monopolization) by SOEs. The concluding section, then, will indicate competition law enforcement priorities and directions for further research.
II. A Primer on State Ownership in Industrial Policy
State ownership has often been approached as a binary variable in the literature: a firm is either state-owned, or private.[11] However, conceptually state ownership is a lot richer: it can materialize at all levels of government; can involve minority, majority and complete shareholding; and be premised on direct or arms-length management by public officials. Government ownership, therefore, can range from complete shareholding and direct management of municipal waste management companies,[12] to minority, passive shareholding by a national government in a multinational firm.[13] Furthermore, the objective function of a SOE is typically situated on a scale between public interest and profit orientation.[14] This ‘mixed’ objective function has efficiency effects: because of public interest objectives, often through public service obligations, SOEs necessarily operate less efficiently than private firms.[15]
The resurgence of state ownership as a form of crisis-relief,[16] and the successful contribution of SOEs to the advent of economies outside of the Global North[17] thus prompted a renewed interest in state ownership in policy and academic circles. The common thread in this new approach is to view government ownership as a driver for economic, social, and general institutional resilience,[18] which in turn led to a re-thinking of the contribution of GOEs to technological, industrial and societal progress.[19]
Indeed, there are many reasons why the potential of state ownership is recognized as part of industrial policy towards strategic autonomy and sustainability transitions. SOEs tend to be large, influential firms,[20] which operate in critical markets such as extraction and energy,[21] where governments can have more influence on strategy and operations than in private firms.[22] Practically this potential of state ownership can be tapped into by governments by nationalizing private firms into SOEs,[23] capitalizing existing SOEs,[24] engaging in (more) active shareholding in SOEs,[25] regulating SOEs,[26] or a combination thereof.
A nascent empirical literature underscores the potential of state ownership towards (green) industrial policy,[27] and state ownership is increasingly being positioned as a policy tool to manage energy and sustainability crises.[28] At the same time, this development has a profound effect on market structures: through nationalization private markets are turned into mixed markets where SOEs and private firms compete, and capitalization, active shareholding and regulation may affect competitive dynamics on existing mixed markets. The next section, therefore, discusses insights on the functioning of mixed markets.
III. Competition on Mixed Markets
Economists in the field of industrial organization have long studied mixed markets, typically modeling private firms as purely profit driven and SOEs with a objective function of part profit and part social welfare orientation.[29] Generally, this literature has focused either on optimal governance of SOEs on mixed markets, or on competitive outcomes between SOEs and private firms absent government intervention.
As to the first category, the governance of SOEs in governments’ industrial policy has been researched extensively in the mixed markets literature, often related to decisions to nationalize or privatize firms in a market. In an early study it is shown how welfare is maximized when governments nationalize either one or all firms on a market, as compared to a market with multiple SOEs co-existing. In this sense, nationalization can be used as a policy tool to increase welfare.[30] Later studies have built on this premise, by demonstrating that SOEs can be used by policymakers as indirect entry regulation, in order to prevent excess entry by private firms.[31] Furthermore, governments are advised to let GOEs pursue profit alongside social welfare orientation, as this leads to the highest social welfare outcomes.[32] Finally, under some assumptions privatization leads to diminished R&D activity in markets,[33] and to lower welfare when the privatized former SOE remains a (Stackelberg) market leader.[34]
A second category of the mixed markets literature has focused on competitive outcomes on mixed markets. For instance, it is demonstrated how competition in mixed markets yield a higher level of social welfare, but reduced profitability for firms.[35] Moreover, product differentiation can be significantly lower in mixed markets as compared to private markets,[36] while under certain conditions increased product differentiation accelerates competition between SOEs and private firms.[37] At the same time, when an SOE is engaged in price competition against a private competitor while also investing in R&D, this leads to free-riding on the SOE’s innovation — which however does increase overall welfare.[38]
It should be noted that the above studies rely on economic modelling with varying assumptions, types of competition (Bertrand, Cournot, Stackelberg) and market structures (duopoly, oligopoly). Consequently, it is hard to arrive at generalizable conclusions on the pros and cons of mixed markets based on the industrial organization literature. This diffuse review of the literature should serve as a cautionary tale: competition on mixed markets is a highly complex affair, which doesn’t necessarily allow for the tried-and-tested policy interventions of private markets.
IV. Anticompetitive Outcomes on Mixed Markets
As mixed markets are particular, their actual or potential anticompetitive outcomes may be unpredictable. At the same time, with the increased prominence of state ownership on markets has come concern about incentives towards anticompetitive behavior by SOEs.[39] The current section, then, conceptualizes the actual or potential anticompetitive conduct by SOEs by focusing on collusion and abuse of dominance (monopolization).
A. State Ownership and Collusion
State ownership can potentially induce collusion in two ways: SOEs can be members or ring-leaders of cartels, or the presence of SOEs on markets can lead competing private firms to collude. These scenarios will be analyzed in terms of examples from enforcement practice, coupled with insights that follow from the literature.
Collusion driven by SOEs has been quite common in markets for mining and (fossil fuel) extraction, with the aim of stabilizing markets and revenue streams through price or output cartels.[40] There are also prominent examples of cartel enforcement against SOEs in other (network) industries. In transportation markets, the Hungarian Competition authority fined 3 state-owned rail cargo operators for price fixing,[41] while in a French mixed market price cartel case among logistic providers, a government-owned cartel member received the highest fine.[42] The European Commission, in turn, enforced against a price fixing cartel with multiple SOEs in the rail cargo market in 2015,[43] and in 2021 fined the Belgian, German and Austrian state-owned railway operators for forming a customer allocation cartel in the rail cargo market.[44] Also in air cargo the European Commission enforced against a price fixing cartel between 11 airliners, 3 of which were partially state-owned.[45]
Interestingly, a (small) literature highlights the positive effects of (duopoly) cartels including SOEs. Firstly, research shows how SOEs can be positioned by governments to be stabilizing members of an output cartel with the aim of improving social welfare. The authors explain this outcome by pointing out the role of state-owned banks and energy firms who complement under-investment by private competitors.[46] These findings have been extended in further research, demonstrating that an SOE that is sufficiently social welfare minded will lead to higher social welfare outcomes when part of a public-private cartel. The intuition behind this is that collusion leads the SOE to produce more efficiently by diminishing excess output.[47]
A somewhat larger literature, then, discusses the extent to which SOEs can deter private cartels in oligopolistic markets. The oldest available research on the topic is a data-driven study on waste collection in the Netherlands, which finds that collusion among private firms is highly likely premised on pricing data and concentration levels—this effect is offset, however, by the presence of government-owned waste collectors on the market.[48] Later theoretical research finds, conversely, that the presence of a welfare-maximizing SOE on a mixed market incentivizes private competitors to collude on output, effectively by making deviating from the cartel less attractive.[49] In a later game-theoretic study, however, it is demonstrated how a governments’ threat to nationalize a firm is effectively leading private competitors not to form a cartel. The state’s threat of intervention through nationalization thus disrupts incentives to collude.[50] The inverse situation, focusing on the effect of privatization on collusion, has also been studied.[51] Here, the authors found that (output) collusion in fully private markets is easier to sustain than in mixed markets, and that maintaining an SOE thus acts as a deterrent for effective collusion. At the same time, and perhaps counterintuitively, as the number of private competitors in a mixed market becomes larger, their collusion becomes easier to sustain. These findings were expanded in further research on collusion in energy generation markets.[52] Even though these authors find collusion is easier to sustain in a mixed market, colluding is less profitable and less harmful for consumers as compared to a private market. Moreover, this outcome is strengthened when more renewable energy is generated in the market.
In conclusion, it seems that collusion involving SOEs is not a hypothetical scenario: European competition enforcement practice shows telling examples of cartels in (mainly) transportation markets in which SOEs were involved. From the literature, however, emerges a mixed impression of the degree to which SOEs affect the likelihood of collusion. On the one hand, it seems that in duopoly markets SOEs can form cartels that improve social welfare — however, these findings are premised on very few studies. The somewhat larger literature on private cartels on oligopolistic mixed markets, on the other hand, predominantly shows how SOEs deter collusion — either by making private cartels less sustainable, or less profitable.
B. State Ownership and Abuse of Dominance
SOEs can also engage in unilateral anticompetitive conduct: abuse of dominance under EU competition law or monopolization in US antitrust law. Here it is important to stress that such abuse of a dominant position may not (and need not) be intentional: as an SOE (partially) pursues social welfare, it may refuse access, raise output and/or lower prices as a dominant firm through various means. This would leave less remaining demand for private competitors or force them to lower prices — setting off a development that drives them from the market. I will discuss abuse of dominance by SOEs through examples from enforcement practice, followed by insights from the literature.
Particularly in European enforcement practice there have been quite some examples of abuse of dominance cases involving SOEs, often enforced against state-owned postal operators.
Most prominently, the European Commission has brought predatory pricing charges against multiple state-owned postal operators. In Deutsche Post, the Commission found that the German state-owned postal service had set pricing below its incremental cost level through fidelity rebates in the business parcel market—cross-subsidizing this loss through its statutory monopoly in the letter market.[53] Similarly, the Danish state-owned postal service was fined for pricing below cost in the (liberalized) unaddressed mail market, through cross-subsidization via its statutory monopoly on the addressed mail market — thus setting prices that were unsustainable in the long run for competing private firms in the unaddressed mail market.[54] The Dutch competition authority brought predatory pricing charges, combined with discrimination, against the state-owned railway company in 2017, claiming that a below-cost bid in a public procurement tender for a regional railway line constituted predatory pricing.[55] This decision was annulled by the appeals court, however.[56]
Another type of abuse charge that has in several cases been brought against SOEs concerns rebates. The landmark case in this respect is Post Danmark II, in which the Danish state-owned postal provider was (again) found to have abused its dominance through a conditional rebate scheme in the direct advertising market, forcing private competitors out of the market.[57] In a similar case, the Spanish Competition Authority issued a ~€33 million fine to the dominant state-owned postal operator Correos for deterring entry through a rebate scheme in the letter market.[58]
Furthermore, there have been some examples of refusal to supply cases brought against SOEs. At the European level, the SOE Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH) was initially fined €77 million by the European Commission for refusal to supply. BEH was vertically integrated by operating the gas infrastructure while also offering gas to consumers downstream, and allegedly restricted access and hoarded infrastructure capacity to exclude downstream competitors.[59] Upon appeal, however, the Commission’s Decision was annulled by the General Court on various grounds.[60] The Spanish competition authority fined the Spanish state-owned postal provider for refusing access by competitors at the wholesale level to the Spanish postal network.[61] Another noteworthy refusal to supply case is Lithuanian Railways, if only for the brazen kind of abuse of dominance it portrays. Here the vertically integrated, state-owned railway company of Lithuania demolished 19km of its railway tracks to prevent competing railway operators downstream to use a shorter route towards ports in Latvia.[62] This case stands out because it is one of the very few cases in which the European courts found that firm behavior could have no other plausible motivation but to deliberately restrict competition, so that actual anticompetitive effects would not even need to be established.[63]
Given the prevalence and scope of abuse of dominance enforcement against SOEs, it stands out how sparse the literature is on this topic. In a set of related articles, Sappington & Sidak formally explain how the objective function of an SOE towards social welfare and profit leads to a preference of expanded scale and scope: higher output through below-cost prices. The authors thus argue that SOEs have the incentive to engage in predatory pricing.[64] These findings are affirmed in subsequent legal research that factors in the price level (average variable cost, average incremental cost, average total cost, etc.) at which predatory pricing charges have been brought against SOEs and private firms across jurisdictions.[65] More recently the initial findings of Sappington & Sidak were replicated through the modeling of a mixed duopoly market with both Bertrand and Cournot competition, where indeed an SOE that values output over profit will engage in below-cost (predatory) pricing when facing an equally efficient private competitor.[66]
As with collusion, the above analysis shows that abuse of dominance charges against SOEs are not uncommon at all. In fact, a pattern emerges in which SOEs with a statutory monopoly in network industries abuse their dominance in adjacent or downstream markets. The super-dominance that a statutory monopoly entails, seems to allow these SOEs the independence from competitors and consumers to engage in abusive behavior in other markets. In this sense, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) rightly remarked that while dominant firms have a (generally applicable) special responsibility not to allow their conduct to impair “genuine, undistorted competition,” this responsibility holds especially true in case of (former) statutory monopolies.[67]
The paucity of literature on abuse of dominance by SOEs is problematic considering the patterns found in enforcement practice. As the scarce available literature is squarely focused on predatory pricing, there appears to be no comprehensive research available on the incentives of SOEs to engage in rebates or refusal to supply. Moreover, the literature on predatory pricing is purely theoretical and lacks empirical support, either through data science or experimental research.
V. Conclusion
State ownership is increasingly becoming a tool for industrial policy across the globe, particularly when this industrial policy is geared towards strategic autonomy and/or sustainability transitions. The promise of state ownership towards these policy goals is compelling, both intuitively and supported by a growing empirical literature. State ownership may indeed provide better opportunities to pursue energy independence, energy transition and reduced emissions.
However, with the advent of state ownership, competitive dynamics on existing mixed markets change and new mixed markets emerge. SOEs may gain market power and behave anticompetitively. In this article I have developed a risk analysis of the actual or potential anticompetitive behavior by SOEs following from their increased prominence on markets.
It turns out that there is quite a recent track record of collusion by SOEs engaged in cartels, particularly in transportation markets. The image that emerges from the literature, however, is that at least in duopoly markets collusion involving an SOE may improve social welfare. Moreover, multiple studies have demonstrated how collusion is less attractive on a mixed oligopoly than on a private oligopoly: SOEs thus effectively deter collusion by private competitors. Based on this assessment of enforcement practice and literature, it seems that the risk of collusion that follows from increased SOE presence on markets may be minor.
There has also been significant enforcement against SOEs allegedly engaged in abuse of dominance (monopolization), particularly concerning cases of predatory pricing, rebates and refusal to supply. Clear patterns emerge where dominant SOEs benefit from the safety of a statutory monopoly and leverage this market power towards adjacent markets. Here, however, the literature is able to provide much less guidance, as there is only (theoretical) research available on predatory pricing by SOEs. Therefore, the risk of an increase of dominant SOEs abusing their market power is currently hard to substantiate, where indeed there is a need to better qualify and quantify this risk. Further theoretical and empirical research should thus be directed towards the incentives and likelihood of SOEs to abuse their dominance, beyond only predatory pricing. Insights from such further research would allow competition agencies to contribute to the promise of state ownership in industrial policy by effectively enforcing against SOEs.
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[1] Jasper P. Sluijs, PhD (Tilburg Law School) is assistant professor in competition law and regulation at Utrecht University School of Law, and extramural fellow at the Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC). Under the ASCOLA transparency and disclosure declaration, there is nothing to disclose.
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[43] European Commission, AT.40098 – Blocktrains, https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/AT.40098 (last visited Apr 24, 2025).
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[54] Case C-209/10 – Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, (2012).
[55] Autoriteit Consument & Markt, 16.0691.31: Besluit Gedragingen van NS Inzake Openbaarvervoerconcessie in Limburg, ACM/DJZ/2017/203854 (2017), https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/documents/besluit-boete-ns-voor-misbruik-machtspositie-bij-limburgse-aanbesteding.pdf (last visited Apr 25, 2025).
[56] NS v. ACM, (Rb. Rotterdam 2019), https://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2019:5089 (last visited Apr 25, 2025); For further background, see Mariska Van de Sanden & Beetstra, Abuse of Dominance Fine of € 41 Million for Dutch Railway Operator Annulled, Kluwer Competition Law Blog (2019), https://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2019/07/09/abuse-of-dominance-fine-of-e-41-million-for-dutch-railway-operator-annulled/ (last visited Apr 25, 2025).
[57] Case C-23/14 Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet, ECLI:EU:C:2015:651 (ECJ 2015).
[58] Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, Expte. S/0341/11, CORREOS (2013), https://www.cnmc.es/sites/default/files/322403.pdf (last visited Apr 25, 2025); For further background, see Candela Sotes, CNMC Fines the Spanish National Postal Company Eur 32.6 Million for Abuse of Its Dominant Position, https://www.twobirds.com/en/insights/2022/spain/cnmc-fines-the-spanish-national-postal-company-eur-32,-d-,6-million-for-abuse-of-its-dominant-position (last visited Apr 25, 2025).
[59] European Commission, AT.39816 – BEH (2018), https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/AT.39816 (last visited Apr 25, 2025).
[60] Case T-136/19 Bulgarian Energy Holding EAD and Others v. European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2023:669 (GC 2023).
[61] Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, supra note 57.
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[63] Case T-814/17 Lietuvos geležinkeliai AB v. European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2020:545 (GC 2020); Lietuvos geležinkeliai AB v. European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2023:12 (ECJ 2023).
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