The headline was that Google will need to face a consumer antitrust lawsuit over its search dominance. But the details in the judge’s decision show something broader. The court signaled that consumers can press an antitrust case even when the alleged harm is not a higher “price” in dollars.
The plaintiffs say they pay with their time, attention and data. They also say a more competitive market could have produced search options with fewer ads, stronger privacy or even rewards for searching. U.S. District Judge Rita F. Lin said those theories are plausible enough to move into the next stage of the case.
The case, James Attridge et al. v. Google LLC, is a proposed class action brought by four consumers. The plaintiffs rely heavily on findings of fact from the Justice Department’s 2024 search case, and the judge treated that prior opinion as incorporated into the complaint for purposes of this motion.
The consumers allege Google unlawfully shut out rivals in U.S. general search services through default-search agreements with device makers, carriers, sellers and browser developers. Under those contracts, Google is allegedly preset as the default search engine across Apple devices, major Android devices, Apple’s Safari and Mozilla’s Firefox. Google moved to dismiss all claims. The judge granted the motion only in a narrow slice and otherwise let the case proceed.
One key angle in the order is how the judge handled “antitrust injury,” which is the gatekeeping issue in many private antitrust cases. Google argued the lawsuit rests on unrealistic “what if” claims about a world where rival search engines would have paid users or offered materially better privacy and ad experiences. The court disagreed, pointing to the complaint’s examples of real products that already try to compete on those features, even if they remain small. The order cites, among other examples, Microsoft’s Bing rewards program, Presearch, and models that pay users for ad viewing or engagement. It also points to privacy-focused and ad-light options like DuckDuckGo, Brave, and subscription models such as Kagi, while noting that Neeva shut down in 2023.
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the judge said it is reasonable to infer that rivals “floundered” because Google’s default deals limited their ability to reach scale and gather enough search data to improve quality.
A second noteworthy angle is how plainly the judge describes why defaults matter. The complaint alleges many users do not change preset search settings. It calls that “choice friction,” meaning the default choice tends to stick. The order accepts that premise for now.
It also highlights the feedback loop at the center of the theory of harm. Search engines need query volume and data to improve results. But without strong distribution, they cannot get the volume to improve. That loop, the plaintiffs argue, can freeze the market in place. The judge found the allegations specific enough to support a plausible link between Google’s agreements, weaker rival scale and reduced consumer choice.
The ruling also reads like a road map for what kinds of consumer harms courts may take seriously in “free” digital markets. In one place, the judge addresses Google’s suggestion that consumer rewards would be too trivial to change behavior. The order notes that a quarter per day adds up over time and compares the logic to familiar rewards programs. That is a simple point, but it is also a consequential one. It treats attention and incentives as real dimensions of competition, not just product “quality.”
Related: US Judge Allows Consumer Antitrust Case Against Google to Move Forward
Another angle is the judge’s treatment of damages arguments. Google leaned on older case law that often narrows private antitrust suits when damages look complex or when plaintiffs are indirect purchasers. The judge emphasized that complexity alone is not a reason to throw out the case at the pleading stage. Citing to an earlier antitrust case, Lin wrote: “Illinois Brick is not a get-out-of-court-free card for monopolistic retailers to play any time that a damages calculation might be complicated.”
The statute-of-limitations section is also important, especially for what it says about ongoing default deals. The judge notes that the federal antitrust claim is generally subject to a four-year limitations period. But the order says the clock was tolled during the pendency of the government’s search case and for one year after. The court also found the complaint plausibly alleges “continuing violations” that restart the clock based on new acts that cause new injury.
The order points to alleged new or revised agreements and enforcement steps, including a 2017 revenue-share agreement with Mozilla, renegotiated Android agreements in 2020 and 2021, and a more recent amendment to Apple’s agreement that covers Google Lens, among other examples. That means the case is timely at least as to conduct tied to agreements and acts since 2017, in the court’s view.
Google did win a narrower point on timing. The judge dismissed the plaintiffs’ attempt to push the time window back further using “fraudulent concealment,” which is a doctrine that can toll the statute if a defendant took specific, affirmative steps to mislead plaintiffs and hide the claim. The court said the complaint’s concealment allegations were not specific enough under the heightened fraud pleading rules and did not adequately allege affirmative misleading acts. But the judge granted leave to amend that part of the case. If the plaintiffs choose to file a third amended complaint, the deadline set in the order is Feb. 20, 2026.
The order also keeps two state-law tracks alive. First, the judge said the California Unfair Competition Law claim can proceed because the federal antitrust claim is plausible. Second, the court allowed an unjust enrichment theory to go forward as a claim for restitution. The plaintiffs allege Google unjustly obtained and kept valuable user data, time and attention as a result of the default agreements.
The judge also rejected Google’s effort to knock out the request for equitable relief at this stage, noting that money damages alone would not fully address the alleged harm of being unable to choose higher-quality search products with fewer ads or stronger privacy.
For payments and the digital economy, the decision is a reminder that distribution payments and default placement can sit at the center of antitrust scrutiny. The order is about search, not cards or wallets. But the mechanics are familiar: revenue-sharing, default placement, and the value of being the first choice on a screen. If this case moves into discovery, it will likely dig deeper into how default deals are negotiated, measured and enforced and how much of Google’s advantage comes from product performance versus paid placement.
