Diogo Thomson de Andrade, Carlos Ragazzo, Jul 24, 2012
Throughout the world, competition authorities are used to allocating much of their human resources to cartel detection and punishment. The main justification for this allotment is linked to the potential harm that these agreements pose for the economy and, foremost, to consumers. It is not a coincidence that many countries criminalize cartels, requiring action not just on behalf of competition authorities but also that of other investigative State authorities, such as, for example, public prosecutors.
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