How Italian Colors Guts Private Antitrust Enforcement by Replacing it with Ineffective Forms of Arbitration
Posted by Social Science Research Network
How Italian Colors Guts Private Antitrust Enforcement by Replacing it with Ineffective Forms of Arbitration– Einer Elhauge (Harvard Law School)
Abstract: The recent US Supreme Court decision in American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant threatens to gut private antitrust enforcement in the United States by replacing it with ineffective forms of arbitration. The Court’s logic that the right to pursue a claim does not include a right to prove it is incoherent. The notion that voluntary consent means arbitration provisions must benefit buyers ignores the fact that buyers have collective action problems that are what justify antitrust law in the first place.
Featured News
Turkey Hits Meta with $37.20 Million Fine Over Data-Sharing Practices
May 8, 2024 by
CPI
Google Seeks Dismissal of UK Suit Over Alleged Anti-Competitive Practices
May 8, 2024 by
CPI
Redfin Settles $9.2M Commission Inflation Lawsuits
May 7, 2024 by
CPI
DOJ Supports Colorado’s Efforts to Block Kroger-Albertsons Merger
May 7, 2024 by
CPI
Japan Considers Regulation of AI Developers
May 7, 2024 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Economics of Criminal Antitrust
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
Navigating Economic Expert Work in Criminal Antitrust Litigation
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
The Increased Importance of Economics in Cartel Cases
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
A Law and Economics Analysis of the Antitrust Treatment of Physician Collective Price Agreements
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
Information Exchange In Criminal Antitrust Cases: How Economic Testimony Can Tip The Scales
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI