Posted by Social Science Research Network
Portfolio Diversification, Market Power, and the Theory of the Firm
By José Azar (University of Navarra)
Abstract: This paper develops a model of firm behavior in the context of oligopoly and portfolio diversification by shareholders. Competition for shareholder votes among potential managers seeking corporate office leads to internalization and aggregation of shareholder objectives, including shareholdings in other firms, and the fact that shareholders are consumers and workers of the firms. When all shareholders hold market portfolios, firms that are formally separate behave as a single firm. I introduce new indices that capture the internalization effects from consumer/worker control, and discuss implications for antitrust, stakeholder theory, and the boundaries of the firm.
Featured News
Dollar Tree to Sell Family Dollar for $1 Billion, Ending Struggling Merger
Mar 26, 2025 by
CPI
Meta Platforms Defends Use of Authors’ Works in AI Training in US Court
Mar 26, 2025 by
CPI
EU Pressed Meta to Address Antitrust Concerns Over Facebook Marketplace
Mar 26, 2025 by
CPI
UBS, Nomura, and UniCredit Fail to Overturn EU Antitrust Fines in Bond Trading Cartel Case
Mar 26, 2025 by
CPI
Coca-Cola Among Firms Targeted in EU Antitrust Raids
Mar 26, 2025 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Mobile Ecosystems
Mar 24, 2025 by
CPI
Mobile Ecosystems: An Intellectual Entelechy but A Necessary Model
Mar 24, 2025 by
Alba Ribera Martinez
Creating Contestability and Fairness in Mobile Ecosystems: The Contribution of the DMA
Mar 24, 2025 by
Damien Geradin & Daniel Mandrescu
Digital Ecosystems and the Not (Yet) As Efficient Competitor Principle
Mar 24, 2025 by
Thomas Hoppner & Philipp Westerhoff
Assessing the Competition Law Scrutiny of Smart Wearables and Mobile AR/VR Devices
Mar 24, 2025 by
Kayvan Hazemi-Jebelli