Bruce Lyons, Nov 01, 2009
The aims of this paper are twofold. First, I explain the economics of bank bailouts as distinct from bailouts for other sectors of the economy. Why do all the rules of good competition policy appear to fly out of the window when the banks get into trouble? Does this mean that we should abandon the rules equally for car manufacturers and other industries in trouble? I argue that a unique combination of two characteristics made it essential to bailout or nationalize the banks in the current crisis. No other sector of the economy can claim the same justification. Second, I review the threat of a retreat to politically- determined industrial policy and the need for vigilant implementation of economic effects-based competition policy.
Featured News
Butterball Moves to End Turkey Antitrust Litigation With $34M Pact
Aug 23, 2026 by
CPI
Uber’s California Racketeering Case Against Lawyers, Doctors Moves Forward
Aug 23, 2026 by
CPI
Epic Challenges Apple’s Compliance With Brazil App Store Antitrust Settlement
Aug 23, 2026 by
CPI
EU Ends Pratt & Whitney Canada Antitrust Probe After Contract Changes
Aug 23, 2026 by
CPI
Paramount, California to Meet Monday on Antitrust Settlement
Aug 23, 2026 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Antitrust Antipasto
Aug 24, 2026 by
CPI
“Anti-Monopoly” Antitrust Enforcement: Lessons Learned from the Biden Administration
Aug 24, 2026 by
Diana L. Moss
FTC v. Meta: The Importance of Quantitative Evidence in Antitrust
Aug 24, 2026 by
Dennis Carlton, John A. List, Allan Shampine, Hal Sider & Theresa Sullivan
Competitor Information Exchanges: Reducing Market Uncertainty Is What Matters, Not Level Of Detail
Aug 24, 2026 by
Kasia Czapracka, Assimakis Komninos, James Killick & Nina Frie
When Politics Meets Merger Control: 10 Transatlantic Takeaways
Aug 24, 2026 by
Rachel Brandenburger