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Informant Reward Schemes in Competition Enforcement

By  |  July 14, 2014

Posted by Social Science Research Network

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    Informant Reward Schemes in Competition Enforcement – Jan PolaÅ„ski

    ABSTRACT: The idea of rewarding private parties who participate in the enforcement of public rules is not uncommon. Still, in the field of competition enforcement the policy of rewarding acts which are beneficial to the public is limited. Typically, it takes the form of forgoing or reducing penalties under leniency programmes or settlement procedures, rather than providing rewards which would benefit their recipients in a more meaningful way. This article discusses why competition enforcement should more firmly follow the policy of providing rewards and financial incentives to private parties and how such systems may work.