Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Jan Bouckaert, University of Antwerp – Department of Economics, Hans Degryse, KU Leuven – Faculty of Business and Economics (FBE) and Theon Van Dijk, Lexonomics analyze Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric Noâ€Discrimination Constraint
ABSTRACT: Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric noâ€discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers’ interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from practicing both behaviourâ€based price discrimination within the competitive segment and thirdâ€degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.
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