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 |  December 20, 2015
In this issue:

Our Autumn 2010 issue has cartels as its primary focus. Doug Ginsburg & Josh Wright argue for increasing punishment to the business people who participate in these price-fixing schemes. Competition authority heads Pieter Kalbfleisch and Mariana Tavares react as do economist Joe Harrington and lawyer Don Klawiter. Continuing the cartel theme are four papers on various historical and economic aspects of cartel enforcement by renowned economists John Connor, Rosa Abrantes-Metz & Patrick Bajari, Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow, and Elisa Mariscal & Carlos Mena-Labarthe.

The next two pieces turn to China. Michael Jacobs & Xinzhu Zhang compare the Chinese approach to IP licensing with U.S. and EU laws.  For our case study, Drs. Ian McEwin & Corinne Chew examine a Chinese Court decision on the Baidu abuse of dominance claim. We end with Dennis Carlton & Sam Peltzman introducing a a reprint of George Stigler’s enormously influential A Theory of Oligopoly.

To download the entire issue as a single PDF, see the link at the bottom of this column.

From the Editor

David Evans, Nov 05, 2010

Letter From the Editor

We extend our thanks to this excellent set of contributors for an insightful collection of articles. David S. Evans (Editor-in-Chief)

Colloquium: Who Should Be the Target of Cartel Sanctions?

Douglas Ginsburg, Joshua Wright, Nov 05, 2010

Antitrust Sanctions

Corporate executives will not be deterred as long as consumers and shareholders bear the brunt of antitrust penalties. Douglas Ginsburg (U.S. Court of Appeals) & Joshua Wright (George Mason Univ.)

Nov 05, 2010

Comment on Antitrust Sanctions

Cartel activity remains high which means that we should push forward on as many fronts as economists and lawyers can dream up. Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins)

Pieter Kalbfleisch, Nov 05, 2010

Antitrust Oversight: More an Art than a Craft

The NMa in recent years has battled violators of the Dutch Competition Act in order to get rid of the Netherlands reputation of cartel paradise. Pieter Kalbfleish (Netherlands Competition Authority)

Mariana Tavares de Araujo, Nov 05, 2010

Improving Deterrence of Hard-Core Cartels

Holding perpetrators accountable and tailoring the optimal mix of sanctions through a combination of administrative and criminal penalties are two core elements of Brazil’s anti-cartel enforcement. Mariana Tavares de Araujo (SDE, Brazil)

Donald Klawiter, Nov 05, 2010

Antitrust Criminal Sanctions: The Evolution of Executive Punishment

The increased focus on the defendant executive raises a number of problems that will keep company counsel, as well as targeted executives and their independent counsel, awake at night. Donald Klawiter (Sheppard Mullin)

A Symposium on Cartel Sanctions

John M. Connor, Nov 05, 2010

Recidivism Revealed: Private International Cartels 1990-2009

High rates of or rising trends in recidivism is evidence that enforcement of a criminal law is failing. John Connor (Purdue Univ.)

Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Patrick Bajari, Nov 05, 2010

Screens for Conspiracies and Their Multiple Applications

Screens are not only useful to antitrust agencies; they can also be powerful tools for plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust cases. Rosa Abrantes-Metz (LECG) & Patrick Bajari (Univ. of Minnesota)

Margaret Levenstein, Valerie Suslow, Nov 05, 2010

Constant Vigilance: Maintaining Cartel Deterrence During the Great Recession

We need to assure that any implementation of an inability to pay policy has specific, objective, and transparent criteria. Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow (Univ. of Michigan)

Elisa Mariscal, Carlos Mena-Labarthe, Nov 05, 2010

Leniency Programs in Latin America: New Tools for Cartel Enforcement

We should focus our efforts to increasing our effectiveness in fighting cartels, a historic and generalized anticompetitive behavior that has plagued our economies. Elisa Mariscal & Carlos Mena-Labarthe (Federal Competition Commission of Mexico)

China: Intellectual Property

Michael Jacobs, Xinzhu Zhang, Nov 05, 2010

China’s Approach to Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property Under Its Anti-Monopoly Law

Antitrust laws differ in their approaches to compulsory licensing not because they subscribe to different schools of economic thought, but because the different political and cultural beliefs that inform and animate them lead inevitably to different answers. Michael Jacobs (DePaul Univ.) & Xinzhu Zhang (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences).

Notable Antitrust Cases

Corinne Chew, R. Ian McEwin, Nov 05, 2010

China”The Baidu Decision

The challenge for the courts will be in surmounting the limited access to economic expertise in newly developing, high-technology markets where the costs of making wrong decisions can be considerable. Dr. Ian McEwin (Nat’l Univ. of Singapore) & Dr. Corinne Chew (Rajah & Tann)

The Classics

Dennis Carlton, Sam Peltzman, Nov 05, 2010

Introduction to Stigler’s Theory of Oligopoly

Stigler’s theory of oligopoly remains a central pillar in merger policy in most, if not all, antitrust regimes around the world. Dennis Carlton & Sam Peltzman (Univ. of Chicago)

George Stigler, Nov 05, 2010

Theory of Oligopoly

Our modification of this theory consists simply in presenting a systematic account of the factors governing the feasibility of collusion, which like most things in this world is not free. (George Stigler)

CPI Autumn 2010 eBook

Contact CPI, Nov 09, 2010

CPI Autumn 2010 eBook

View, download, and print the CPI Autumn 2010 eBook (PDF).