The European Commission’s new non-horizontal merger guidelines envisage a three-step approach to assessing the threat of subsequent foreclosure (European Commission. The first step concerns the merged firm’s ability to distort competition and harm rivals on the upstream or downstream market through full- or partial-foreclosure. The second step deals with the integrated firm’s incentives to foreclose; then followed, as a third and final step, by the assessment of potential competitive harm.
In this article, we focus, in particular, on the second screen: the assessment of the incentives of a vertically integrated firm to partially or fully foreclose its rivals. Throughout our analysis, we focus exclusively on input foreclosure.
Featured News
Prime Therapeutics Found in Violation of Antitrust Laws, Arbitrator Rules
Jan 23, 2025 by
CPI
Honda and Nissan Face Challenges in China Amid Potential Merger
Jan 23, 2025 by
CPI
Trump Criticizes EU’s Tech Crackdown, Calls It ‘A Form of Taxation’
Jan 23, 2025 by
CPI
Meta Faces Fresh Allegations of EU Law Breaches in Subscription Service Rollout
Jan 23, 2025 by
CPI
European Commission Investigates Crypto Rules for Cross-Border Stablecoins
Jan 23, 2025 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – International Criminal Enforcement
Jan 23, 2025 by
CPI
The Antitrust Division’s Recent Work to Combat International Cartels
Jan 23, 2025 by
Emma Burnham & Benjamin Christenson
Information Sharing: The New Frontier of U.S. Antitrust Enforcement
Jan 23, 2025 by
Brian P. Quinn, Casey Kovarik & Michael Tubach
The Key Role of Guidelines on Exchanges of Information Among Competitors and the Divergent Transatlantic Paths
Jan 23, 2025 by
Rosa Abrantes-Metz & Albert Metz
Leniency, Whistleblowers, and Compliance
Jan 23, 2025 by
Richard Powers, Tara O’Malley & Cory Gordon