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Ticketmaster Monopolization Case: Lessons from Mexico

 |  September 16, 2024

CPI COLUMNS Latin America cover

By Alejandra Palacios1 & Laura Alicia Méndez2

 

Ticketmaster presents itself as the world’s largest ticket marketplace and the global leader in live event ticketing products and services.3 The company operates in more than 30 countries, including the U.S. and Mexico. Notably, Ticketmaster has faced antitrust investigations in both countries.

Ticketmaster, owned by Live Nation Entertainment — the world’s largest live entertainment company — has been the subject of both U.S. and Mexican antitrust investigations. A key concern for regulators in both countries is that, in addition to vertical integration, practices such as exclusive dealing with venues may be reinforcing Ticketmaster’s dominance in the live concert industry. This article outlines the main issues raised by the DOJ’s complaint against Ticketmaster and compares them with Mexico’s own abuse of dominance enforcement case of 2015, to explore whether there are lessons for the former to be learned from the latter.

 

I. Live Nation and Ticketmaster Under U.S. Antitrust Scrutiny

Live Nation Entertainment Inc. (Live Nation), owns or controls more than 265 concert venues4 across the United States, including over 60 of the top 100 amphitheatres.5 It also fully owns Ticketmaster LLC (Ticketmaster), the dominant concert ticketing company in the U.S. Live Nation’s operations are segmented into three main areas: (1) Concerts — encompassing promotions, venue management, and music festival production; (2) Ticketing — primarily handled through Ticketmaster; and (3) Sponsorship & Advertising. In 2023, the company generated global revenues of $18.8 billion from concerts, $2.9 billion from ticketing, and $1.1 billion from sponsorship & advertising.6

In May 2024, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed a lawsuit to break up Live Nation and Ticketmaster, accusing them of monopolizing the live concert industry.7 The DOJ claims that Live Nation serves as a “gatekeeper” for the industry, controlling approximately 60 percent of the market for concert promotions, managing over 400 artists, and dominating ticketing services.

The lawsuit outlines several practices that allegedly support Live Nation-Ticketmaster’s monopoly, thereby limiting the entry and expansion of competitors:

  1. By forming collusive partnerships with competitors who subsequently cede concert promotion space to Live Nation;
  2. By threatening venues with the loss of Live Nation-promoted concerts, or by potentially reducing the number of concerts and moving shows to less desirable dates if they opt for another ticketing service;
  3. By restricting artists’ access to venues owned or controlled by Live Nation unless they agree to use the company’s promotional services; and
  4. By acquiring independent promoters perceived as potential competitors, despite these acquisitions making little financial sense.

The case also sheds light on how Ticketmaster and Live Nation control the purchasing and pricing of tickets,8 noting that Ticketmaster’s long-term exclusive ticketing agreements cover more than 75 percent of concert ticket sales at major concert venues.9 These agreements are often pre-emptively renewed or extended, thereby effectively limiting the primary ticketing market for competing ticketers.10

This lawsuit is part of the DOJ’s ongoing antitrust concerns in the live entertainment industry since the 2010 merger between Live Nation and Ticketmaster, which was subject to conduct remedies, was authorized.11 This merger was anticipated to potentially create a vertically integrated monopoly, involving a ticketer, promoter, and venue owner. Consequently, the DOJ required Live Nation to divest certain assets and license Ticketmaster’s ticketing platform to competitors. The consent decree also prohibited Live Nation from retaliating against venues that opted to work with other ticketing services.12

Following repeated transgressions to such decree, DOJ has moved beyond continued monitoring of the imposed conduct rules to declaring its intention to separate Ticketmaster from Live Nation, effectively seeking to undo the 15-year-old merger.

 

II. Ticketmaster’s Antitrust Battles in Mexico

Ticketmaster Mexico, officially “Venta de Boletos por Computadora,” operates under a co-investment agreement between Ticketmaster and Corporación Interamericana de Entretenimiento (CIE Group) to sell tickets for public events and entertainment venues in Mexico and throughout Latin America. It is the leading ticketing company in the country, selling approximately 20 million tickets annually.13 Much like Live Nation in the U.S., CIE Group is a major player in Latin America’s “out-of-home entertainment industry.” It engages in concert promotion, venue management (including 13 premier venues across Mexico), ticket sales, and also manages and commercializes artistic talent. As part of Grupo CIE, the company includes subsidiaries such as OCESA Entretenimiento, which specializes in live show promotion, and Operadora de Centros de Espectáculos, which manages event venues. Beyond Ticketmaster, CIE also owns ETK Boletos, another ticketing company that operates under the brand “E-Ticket,” targeting smaller and local events. Together, these companies offer a comprehensive range of services within the live entertainment industry.14

In 2015, nine years before the U.S. DOJ’s complaint against Live Nation-Ticketmaster, COFECE, the Mexican antitrust agency, launched an investigation against Grupo CIE and its subsidiary, Ticketmaster Mexico, for exclusive dealing in the market for “live show production and promotion; the operation and management of live event venues; and the automated distribution and sale of tickets.”15

As in the U.S., venue owners in Mexico can either operate the facility themselves or hire a management company to do so,16 and promoters play a crucial role in the live show industry by helping artists book the venue, hire the tech crew, sell tickets, and publicize shows.17

During the investigation, COFECE’s prosecutor found evidence of exclusivity agreements between show venues and/or event promoters and Ticketmaster, along with other clauses that could reinforce such dealings, potentially dominating the ticketing market.18 At that moment, CIE owned or managed many of the country’s most important event venues, including Foro Sol, Palacio de los Deportes, Autodromo “Hermanos Rodríguez” and Auditorio Citibanamex (Nuevo León).19 However, COFECE did not find enough evidence of abusive conducts in the concert promotion market.

To settle the case, in 2018, Grupo CIE agreed to several remedial measures: (a) eliminating all exclusive dealing clauses from contracts with event promoters and venue operators; (b) refraining from including such exclusive dealing clauses for the next 10 years, and (c) not increasing its management portfolio of third-party venues with a capacity over 15,000 people in Mexico City for the next five years. In its resolution, COFECE emphasized the importance of preventing exclusivity agreements from being replaced with mechanisms that could have similar anticompetitive effects. Consequently, it denied CIE’s proposal to offer discounts and integral services instead of exclusive agreements. The agency requested that CIE (Ticketmaster) report future incentive schemes to ensure ongoing monitoring of these activities, acknowledging that such practices could affect market competition.

It is important to note that these remedies primarily addressed COFECE’s concerns about potential abuse of dominance by Ticketmaster in ticketing services for live shows through exclusive dealing agreements. In that moment, CIE was still competing with Live Nation in the promotion market and their partnership was limited to the ticketing industry. Unlike the U.S. monopolization case, the Mexican antitrust authority did not assess CIE’s potential market power in live show promotion nor introduced measures to curb possible abuse of such power.

One year after the settlement, in 2019, COFECE authorized Live Nation to acquire a 51 percent controlling interest in CIE’s assets,20 without imposing remedial measures. Initial concerns that Live Nation could use its influence to channel national events through CIE’s promoting arm, OCESA, potentially excluding other promoters, were alleviated by evidence showing that artists often negotiate with various international promoters. At that time, only a small percentage of international artists who had performed in high-capacity amphitheaters in Mexico were associated with Live Nation.

COFECE’s latest action against CIE Group, Ticketmaster’s Mexico holding company, came in 2021 when the regulator imposed a 54,000 USD fine on it for not fully complying with the 2018 settlement resolution. This fine was due to failure to include non-exclusive dealing provisions in 25 ticketing services agreements.21

 

III. Will Antitrust Cases Drive Greater Competition?

Antitrust enforcement aims to foster competitive markets, ultimately benefiting consumers by lowering prices, enhancing quality, and promoting innovation. The primary concern with anti-competitive behavior is typically the resultant high prices.

A. Is Ticketmaster’s Dominance Raising Prices in the Concert Industry?

Ticket prices comprise the face value price and additional fees and taxes.22 The face value refers to the price of the ticket before service fees and taxes are added, and as such covers promotion costs and venue hire. Additional fees may include a service fee, an order processing fee, and a delivery fee.

According to the DOJ, dismantling the Ticketmaster-Live Nation monopoly could lead to lower prices for consumers. Over recent years, Live Nation has increased the concert promotion fees it imposes on venues, which have been directly passed on to consumers through ticket pricing.23

The DOJ’s lawsuit highlights that artists have had fewer opportunities to perform, with limited viable options for promoting their concerts, selling tickets on their own, or choosing performance venues.24 Given Live Nation’s extensive network of venues, which is largely only made accesible to artists that the company promotes, it is difficult for artists to work with other promoters if they want to perform in a Live Nation-owned or controlled venue.25 Additionally, the venues themselves are often hesitant to challenge the status quo due to financial risks, facing limited choices for obtaining concerts and ticketing services.26 Given Live Nation’s monopoly power in concert bookings and promotional services for major venues in the United States, it can extract supra competitive payments from venues, including onerous, restrictive contractual terms in exchange for providing them with content.27

With Ticketmaster facing no significant competition in the ticketing market for live events, final ticketing prices fully reflect these increased fees, along with other additional service fees. In terms of additional fees, DOJ believes fans have paid more because of a lack of transparency, items that are not negotiable, and non-existent comparison-shopping because there are simply no other options.28

Conversely, Live Nation argues that even if the lawsuit succeeds, it won’t lead to cheaper ticket prices, claiming that the DOJ “ignores the basic economics of live entertainment.”29 According to Ticketmaster, “artists, promoters, sports leagues, or teams decide how they want to sell their tickets on Ticketmaster’s marketplace. That includes setting the face value prices, determining how many tickets to sell, and when to put them on sale.”30 If the face values of tickets are typically set or approved by artists, and Ticketmaster doesn’t keep any portion of the face value price of a ticket,31 how can it be blamed for high ticket prices?32 Regarding additional fees, Live Nation contends that fees on Ticketmaster are comparable to those on other primary ticketing sites, or even lower,33 and are determined and shared between the parties involved in making the live event happen.34

In the Mexican antitrust case against Ticketmaster, there has been no ex post evaluation of enforcement intervention to determine its effect on ticket prices, though it is safe to assume they did not decrease.

A significant factor in both the Mexican and U.S. cases is vertical integration. In Mexico, Ticketmaster’s intra-group relationships with CIE, the largest promoter and venue manager in Latin America, played a pivotal role. However, in the Mexican antitrust case, CIE’s market dominance in venue management and event promotion was not thoroughly examined. As mentioned, the remedial measures imposed at the time only dealt with exclusivities between venues and/or event promoters and Ticketmaster. In contrast, in the DOJ case, the concert promotion business is central as Live Nation leverages its market power in concert promotion over the ticketing market.

According to the DOJ, the exclusive dealing agreements between Ticketmaster and venues are part of a broader pattern of retaliation and other exclusionary practices that sustain Live Nation’s revenue cycle, which the company refers to as its “flywheel.”35 Given that the lack of competition stems from structural problems (i.e. vertical integration), the DOJ is seeking a structural solution: the breakup of Live Nation and Ticketmaster.

B. Is Ticketmaster’s Dominance Stifling Innovation?

Ticketmaster claims that its service fees are allocated to security technology, websites and apps, payment provider costs, staffing, and ticket scanners.36 However, the DOJ argues that Live Nation and Ticketmaster’s anti-competitive behaviors have prevented fans from experiencing the benefits of a competitive marketplace, including innovative and fan-friendly ticketing options.37 Either way, Ticketmaster has faced numerous complaints in both the U.S. and Mexico, centered around allegations of unfair commercial practices and data protection issues.

In the U.S., one notable incident involving Ticketmaster happened during the sale of tickets for Taylor Swift’s Eras Tour, where the site crashed due to an overwhelming number of customers attempting to purchase tickets. This led to a 2023 U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee hearing to investigate the matter.38 During the hearing, legislators expressed their concerns regarding Ticketmaster’s market power and its effects on consumers, and discussed possible remedies, including the break-up of Live Nation-Ticketmaster.39

Later in July of this year, Ticketmaster reported a significant hacking incident that compromised its North American customer database. The company alerted customers to the potential risk of identity theft and fraud, confirming that hackers had accessed names and basic contact details.40 The breach also included encrypted credit card information, though the specifics of the data obtained were not fully disclosed.

In Mexico, Ticketmaster has been involved in controversies concerning unfair commercial practices. A recent case ended in April when Ticketmaster settled a class-action lawsuit initiated by the Federal Consumer Protection Bureau (PROFECO) due to event cancellations between 2020 and 2023. The lawsuit originated from a 2022 Bad Bunny concert at Estadio Azteca, where fans experienced problems in accessing the venue due to duplicated tickets sold through Ticketmaster, as well as multiple complaints received by PROFECO regarding unilateral ticket cancellations, non-compliance with initially offered conditions, and refusals to refund the full ticket cost including service charges.41

As a result, Ticketmaster refunded over 3.4 million pesos to approximately 500 consumers affected by these cancellations. In response to these challenges, Ticketmaster launched the “Ticketmaster MX” app and the digital ticket SafeTix, to enhance ticket purchase security and to combat forgery, duplication, and unauthorized resale.42

Therefore, it seems that there is room for improvement in customer service and innovation within the ticketing industry. So far, Ticketmaster’s efforts seem to focus more on addressing past challenges rather than being disruptive or truly enhancing the fan experience. In our view, a competitive and dynamic live concert industry should prioritize not only strengthening security to prevent ticket counterfeiting but also ensuring robust data protection, fair terms—such as flexible refund policies—and transparent pricing practices. On this last point, it is worth noting that in September of this year, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in the United Kingdom launched an investigation into Ticketmaster over its dynamic pricing of concert tickets.43

 

IV. Conclusion

The U.S. DOJ’s, UK’s CMA, and Mexico COFECE’s cases against Ticketmaster stem from a series of concerns about competition and unfair practices in the live concert industry.

As mentioned, in Mexico, Ticketmaster has already faced antitrust scrutiny, primarily due to exclusive dealing agreements between Ticketmaster and venues or promoters. This case was settled by ending those exclusive deals and limiting Ticketmaster’s parent company, CIE, from operating additional venues in Mexico City. While no ex post competition analysis has been conducted, it is likely that the Mexican ticketing industry has not seen significant changes since the settlement. Recent innovations in ticketing have been driven more by concerns about unfair consumer practices.

Unlike the Mexican case, the DOJ’s challenge goes beyond exclusive dealing practices, targeting vertical integration itself. The DOJ argues that Live Nation, owner of Ticketmaster, functions as a “gatekeeper” for the entire live entertainment industry, wielding monopoly power over ticketing, artist promotion, and venue ownership. The DOJ also raises concerns about tying practices between a venue’s use and promotion services.

If successful, the DOJ’s case should have a more significant impact on the live concert industry than the Mexican settlement. The concern is that Live Nation’s vertical integration allows it to leverage its dominance across multiple markets. Therefore, breaking up Live Nation and Ticketmaster could could limit the company’s ability to exert such control across the industry.

However, the case is still under judicial review, and Live Nation is expected to present evidence of the efficiencies of its business model. What is clear is that this case will continue to attract widespread public interest and remain in the spotlight for the coming months.

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1 Antitrust Expert. Former Chair at COFECE, 2014 – 2021.

2 LLM in Competition Law. Antitrust Expert. Former Director General of Unilateral Conduct at COFECE, 2017-2019.

3 Press release. TikTok & Ticketmaster Expand Partnership Across 20+ Countries to Help Artists Sell Tickets to Fans Directly in the App. https://business.ticketmaster.com/press-release/tiktok-and-ticketmaster-expand-partnership-across-20-countries-to-help-artists-sell-tickets-to-fans-directly-in-the-app/.

4 “Venue” is the site where an event or concert is held.

5 Justice Department Sues Live Nation-Ticketmaster for Monopolizing Markets Across the Live Concert Industry (23 May,2024) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-live-nation-ticketmaster-monopolizing-markets-across-live-concert.

5 DOJ Complaint against Ticketmaster, p.9. https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1353101/dl.

7 Justice Department Sues Live Nation-Ticketmaster for Monopolizing Markets Across the Live Concert Industry (23 May,2024) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-live-nation-ticketmaster-monopolizing-markets-across-live-concert.

8 Idem.

9 DOJ Complaint against Ticketmaster, p.40.

10 DOJ Complaint against Ticketmaster, p. 41.

11 DOJ Seeks an Encore Showdown with Live Nation and Ticketmaster (28 May, 2024) https://www.wsgr.com/en/insights/doj-seeks-an-encore-showdown-with-live-nation-and-ticketmaster.html.

12 Idem.

13 Live Nation Closes Acquisition Of OCESA, The Third Largest Promoter Globally and Leading Live Entertainment Company in Mexico, Further Growing Business In Latin America. https://www.livenationentertainment.com/2021/12/live-nation-closes-acquisition-of-ocesa-the-third-largest-promoter-globally-and-leading-live-entertainment-company-in-mexico-further-growing-business-in-latin-america/.

14 https://www.ocesa.com.mx/nosotros.

15 https://www.cofece.mx/cofece/images/AI/IO-005-2015_Extracto_acuerdo_inicio_13052016.pdf.

16 DOJ Complaint against Ticketmaster, p.12

17The Live Music Sector. https://cmulibrary.com/livemusic/.

18 Resolución IO-005-2015. COFECE.

19 Idem.

20 CIE. Declaración de Información sobre Reestructuración Societaria de fecha 6 de septiembre de 2019, https://www.bmv.com.mx/docs-pub/reescorp/reescorp_951114_1.pdf.

21 Incidente de cumplimiento y ejecución Expediente COMP-004-2018-1. 5519460.pdf (cofece.mx).

22 https://help.ticketmaster.com/hc/en-us/articles/9663528775313-How-are-ticket-prices-and-fees-determined.

23 DOJ Complaint against Ticketmaster, p.18.

24 Idem, p.54.

25 Idem, p.72.

26 Idem, p.54.

27 Idem, p. 71.

28 Idem, p.54.

29 What the major Ticketmaster lawsuit means for you, (May 23, 2024) https://edition.cnn.com/2024/05/23/tech/what-the-ticketmaster-lawsuit-means-for-you/index.html.

30 https://help.ticketmaster.com/hc/en-us/articles/9663528775313-How-are-ticket-prices-and-fees-determined.

31 https://help.ticketmaster.com/hc/en-us/articles/9663528775313-How-are-ticket-prices-and-fees-determined.

32Update: Breaking Down The DOJ Lawsuit, https://www.livenationentertainment.com/2024/05/update-breaking-down-the-doj-lawsuit/.

33 Idem.

34 https://help.ticketmaster.com/hc/en-us/articles/9663528775313-How-are-ticket-prices-and-fees-determined.

35 DOJ Complaint against Ticketmaster, p.27.

36 https://www.livenationentertainment.com/2024/05/update-breaking-down-the-doj-lawsuit/.

37 DOJ Complaint against Ticketmaster, p.54.

38 S. Hrg. 118-31 – That’s the Ticket: Promoting Competition and Protecting Consumers in Live Entertainment (January 24, 2024). https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/committee-activity/hearings/thats-the-ticket-promoting-competition-and-protecting-consumers-in-live-entertainment, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-118shrg52250/CHRG-118shrg52250.

39 Senate Hearing on Ticketmaster Hearing Takeaways: After Taylor Swift Debacle, Some Senators Call Live Nation a ‘Monopoly’ (January 24, 2024) https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/01/24/arts/ticketmaster-taylor-swift.

40 Ticketmaster warns customers to take action after hack (July 9, 2024) https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c729e3qr48qo.

41 Juez admite demanda colectiva contra Ticketmaster y Ocesa: Profeco (28 April, 2023) https://aristeguinoticias.com/2804/mexico/juez-admite-demanda-colectiva-contra-ticketmaster-y-ocesa-profeco/.

42 Profeco y Ticketmaster ponen fin a demanda de Acción Colectiva (24 April, 2024) https://www.gob.mx/profeco/prensa/profeco-y-ticketmaster-ponen-fin-a-demanda-de-accion-colectiva.

43 Adam Brown, Don’t Log Out in Anger: Dynamic Pricing of Oasis Tickets as an Exploitative Abuse?, (September 6, 2024). https://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2024/09/06/dont-log-out-in-anger-dynamic-pricing-of-oasis-tickets-as-an-exploitative-abuse/.

The Competition Commission of India and Digital Markets The Competition Commission of India and Digital Markets | PYMNTS.com

The Competition Commission of India and Digital Markets

 |  April 11, 2025

By Geeta Gouri[1]

 

I. Introduction

Ex ante intervention by ex post competition regulators of digital markets is a new development for India’s competition regulator. The trend in Europe and the U.S. towards emphasizing ex ante rules of market behavior has prompted authorities in India to also develop ex ante rules for the regulation of digital markets.

Many authorities worldwide are concerned with the rise of a handful of large multinational companies that have established themselves as the gatekeepers to digital markets. In response, they have designed policies to encourage domestic platforms.

Platforms have spawned multiple markets on their platforms. Here, we refer specifically to data on certain markets and markets for ideas (patents) at the European Commission seminar held at Florence. Cases regarding these two markets have been filed before the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”). Digital markets in India are marked by three features;

  • Protectionist;
  • Emphasis on emergent markets – Platform Markets, Data Markets and Market for Ideas;
  • Ex ante market rules issued by the CCI.

The output of the Indian Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance has been the basic source for policies on digital markets. It identified the factors that define the size of these markets in a short span of time, defined as Systemically Significantly Digital Enterprises (“SSDEs”).

It was this Committee that observed that SSDEs tip very quickly. SSDEs need to be identified early based on their revenue, market capitalization, and number of active businesses. This necessitates an ex ante assessment of anti-competitive behavior.

Further, a Digital Competition Act needs to be passed and a separate branch focused on digital markets created within the CCI.

So far, we have referred to “markets” as a homogenous group. But differences between markets may require additional or altogether different regulations. I will focus on two prominent digital markets – data markets and markets for ideas (patents).

The Competition Act of India (CA02, 2002) was framed to assess factors that lead to an appreciable adverse effect on competition (“AAEC”) for traditional product markets. The Act’s emphasis was on market size and monopolization.

A new dimension added for consideration when assessing data markets is the spread of misinformation. Several advisories and warnings have already been issued in this regard. A January 2024 advisory mandated intermediaries to comply with the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (IT Rules) and to curb spread of misinformation by “deepfakes.”

The owners of broadcasting spectrum such as Jio aim at expanding their reach. The likelihood of “Abusive Agreements” and “Abuse of Dominance” actions by spectrum owners requires new regulations. CCI has responded with ex ante rules of market conduct (the “Ten Rules”) that raise queries as to whether the regulator sets the design of future markets or regulates the permissible and acceptable design of markets.

Disagreements between the government and the CCI over whether to shape the market or to encourage its growth remain unresolved.

II. Platform Markets, Data Markets, and Markets for Ideas

In my book “A Commissioner’s Primer to the Economics of Competition Law in India” (Palgrave Macmillan’s. Singapore, 2023), I identified four market types based on their features and economics. SSDEs fall within the framework of platform markets. The diversity of markets suggests designing innovative regulatory interventions for each, unlike prevalent traditional (non-digital) markets

The economics of platform markets and their viability depend on generating economies of scale and scope. I will restrict myself to Platform markets and the two categories of sub-markets: Data markets and Markets for Ideas.

Elements differentiating between these categories include:

  1. conventional or traditional product markets with a continuum from perfect competition to monopoly, to monopolistic competition;
  2. platform markets (usually on the internet) characterized by two sides, with sellers and buyers on one side and advertisers on the other. Data network effects result in the emergence of “giant” tech firms;
  3. data markets emerging from access to the data generated and traded on platform markets; from compiling and computing varied data that is anonymized and atomized; from finding a niche in the monetization of data and to emerge as a quasi-public good;
  4. market for ideas of patents and knowledge – Standard Essential Patents (“SEPs”) and bundles of patents that determine the capability of telecommunication systems used by service providers.

III. Data Markets

The sale of data by platforms has raised uncomfortable questions regarding the ownership of data and the accrual of revenue from the sale of said data. The sheer variety and extent of Indian data has whetted the appetites of platforms. A spate of regulations aimed at platform markets, particularly directed at the five “Big Tech” companies, is not only meant to help build up “India Platforms” as a counter to the global platform markets, but also to counter their access to data.

The prominence of data has generated Data Markets enhancing the importance of platform markets. Technical Institutes such as the Indian Institutes of Technology are now selling data (scientific data; software improvements; Artificial Intelligence). Startups prefer to buy data related to their business rather than establishing data collection centers of their own.

A multiplicity of regulations and regulatory authorities characterize the platform market scenario in India. Regulations have been issued by the Ministries of Finance, of Commerce, and of Information Technology; by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (“TRAI”) and by the CCI. The CCI has, in quick succession, issued decisions on antitrust abuses regarding Big Tech and ecommerce, extending its scope from being only an ex -post regulator to also being an ex ante regulator.

IV. Digital Competition Act

The draft Digital Competition Bill 2024 was introduced in Parliament in March 2024. It has yet to come up for discussion. The Digital Personal Data Protection Bill (2003) was passed by Parliament on Aug.9, 2023. The Bill Lays down Guidelines for processing digital personal data in a manner that recognized the rights of individuals to protect their personal data and the need to process such personal data for lawful purposes.

The Digital Competition Act was suggested by the powerful Parliamentary Committee on Finance to selectively regulate digital enterprises in an ex ante manner. This meant defining which digital enterprises could be considered “Systemically Significantly Digital Enterprise” (“SSDE”) in terms of value or turnover. It also required the definition of penalties. The obligation of self-reporting to the CCI by SSDEs as applicable under sub-section 2 of Section 3 is mandatory.

The Government has also announced policies to encourage the growth of domestic platforms. Online e-commerce players such as Meesho and Reliance-Jio are examples of such domestic platforms. The economics of nurturing local platform markets while retaining the global outreach of e-markets is reminiscent of protectionist policy of the 70s and 80s.

DOT has identified 36 products such as routers, ethernet switches, media gateways and Gigabit Passive Optical Network equipment in which the local content should not be below 50 percent and in some cases not lower than 60 percent.

The scenario is complex, as there are i) the “Big Five” tech companies, who need to be regulated; along with ii) local platforms –SSDEs- who need to be protected. Consequently, the Commission, in defining fairness in competition, retains the process adopted in mergers: i) will every successful enterprise be seen as unfair in the eyes of competitors? and ii) what is the role of competitive constraints in ensuring that dominant players do not assert their position (presumed to be superior) on account of their large size?

Allegations in the digital market arena often hinge around Abuse of Dominance (Section 4 of the Act) and not on Section 3, Anti-competitive Agreements; where “dominant position” means a position of strength held by an enterprise in the relevant markets which allows said enterprise to i) operate independently of other competitive forces prevailing in the market; ii) manipulate its competitors, consumers, or the relevant market in its favor.

V. Rules of Fairness

The CCI recently announced “Ten Conduct Rules” for Licensable Operating Systems, directed at the use of Android mobile devices in a market dominated by two mobile ecosystems: Android and Apple. These ten rules determine that users of Android are part of a Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (“MADA”), Anti-fragmentation Agreement (“AFA”), Android Compatibility Commitment Agreement (“ACC”), and Revenue Sharing Agreement (“RSA”).

The ten rules issued by CCI reveal markets envisaged in terms of market fairness, similar to those issued by the EU Commission. The rules include:

  1. Anti-Steering Provisions: The Committee recommended that SSDEs should not define the conditions of usage, including: (i) access to the platform; (ii) preferred status; or (iii) placement on the platform, for the purchase or use of products or services which are not part of or intrinsic to the platform.
  2. Platform Neutrality and Self-Preferencing: The Committee opined that platform neutrality must be ensured at all costs, observing that self-preferencing (i) leads to negative effects on downstream markets; and (ii) gives an unfair advantage to the leading player, i.e., the platform itself. Self-preferencing by mediating access to supply and sales markets by presenting its own offers in a more favorable manner; or by pre-installing its own offers on devices or integrating them in any way in offers provided by the platform was also deemed not acceptable.
  3. Bundling and tying: In keeping with the rejection of self-preferencing the Committee opted to discourage “bundling and tying” of related services which results in: (i) information asymmetry; (ii) restriction of consumer choices; and (iii) elimination of rival companies, ultimately leading to consumers paying higher prices. Further, SSDEs should not force business users or end consumers to subscribe to or register with any ancillary services as a condition for being able to use any of the platform’s core services.
  4. Data Usage:Access to data, particularly the exclusive data of digital companies, has become a major factor to ensure supremacy among digital companies as data emerges as the new oil of digital business. Data is a zero-price or non-price factor. As a country where surveys and data availability provide a rich source of varied data its usage was a major concern revolving on data privacy. Access to data by platform markets that require no permission can harm privacy and hamper the development of a competitive digital business environment.

Thus, the Committee recommended that SSDEs should not: (i) process the personal data of consumers (using services of third parties) to provide online advertising services; (ii) combine personal data from relevant core services of the platform with personal data from third-party services; (iii) cross-use personal data from relevant core services into other services; and (iv) sign consumers on to other services within the platform in order to combine personal data, unless a specific choice has been given to the end consumer and consent has been obtained.

  1. Mergers and Acquisitions: The Committee observed that “killer acquisitions” are one of the issues most frequently raised in digital markets. Given that the CCI reviews transactions based on asset and turnover-based thresholds, several high value transactions involving Big Tech companies have escaped the CCI’s scrutiny since they did not meet the prescribed thresholds. Accordingly, the Committee recommended that a SSDE should, prior to the implementation of any intended concentration or any agreement, public tender announcement, or acquisition of a controlling interest in another company, inform the CCI of any such concentration where the merging entities or the target company provide services in the digital sector or enable the collection of data, irrespective of whether it is notifiable to the CCI.
  2. Deep Discounting and Dynamic Pricing: The Committee observed that deep discounting is a common concern peculiar to e-commerce, food delivery, and hotel booking sites. Further, practices such as “dynamic pricing,” bogus sales, and markdowns have: (i) resulted in service providers losing control over the final price, since the authority to determine discount rates rests with the platform; and (ii) impaired the ability of offline players to sell and make profits.

Thus, the Committee recommended that SSDEs should not: (a) limit business users from differentiating commercial conditions on its platforms; and (b) prevent business users from offering the same products or services to end consumers through third-party online intermediation services or through their own direct online sales channels at different prices/conditions (i.e. the recent merger of Disney with Jio).

  1. Exclusive Tie-Ups and Parity Clauses: The Committee observed that exclusive arrangements by the e-commerce platforms not only hamper the business of other e-commerce platforms but may also lead to losses for brick-and-mortar sellers. Additionally, the inclusion of platform price parity (“PPP”) clauses results in increased prices for the consumer.

Accordingly, the Committee opined that exclusive tie-ups by major digital platforms can: (i) foreclose markets; (ii) restrict competition; and (iii) ultimately lead to increased prices for the consumer. Therefore, the Committee recommended that SSDEs should not prevent business users from offering the same products or services to end consumers through third-party online intermediation services or through their own direct online sales channels at different prices/conditions, so that fair market conditions prevail.

  1. Search and Ranking Preferencing: The Committee observed that users search using keywords on any platform and receive results based on algorithms. As such, organic search results should list products/services without any bias, i.e., list top selling or highest rated results on the top rather than prioritizing any sponsored products. However, if the search results show any other products taking precedence, it indicates search bias in favor of sponsored products, or orders fulfilled by the platform/marketplace itself. Further, the Committee observed that selecting high-quality, relevant keywords for advertising campaigns can help advertisers reach the right customers at the right time. As such, the Committee recommended that: (i) a SSDE must provide to any third party offering online search engines access to fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms; (ii) any query, click, and view data containing personal data should be anonymized; and (iii) a SSDE should not provide favorable treatment to the products/services/lines of business of its own platform vis-à-vis to those of another business user in an unfair and discriminatory manner.
  2. Third-Party Applications: The Committee observed that gatekeepers restrict the installation or operation of third-party applications and thereby prevent the users from using any application other than their own. In this regard, the Committee recommended that: (i) a SSDE should allow the installation and use of third-party apps/app stores using its own operating system; and (ii) a SSDE should not prevent third-party apps or app stores from being set as default.
  3. Advertising Policies:The Committee observed that consumer data can be leveraged for cost effective targeted advertising, and it has led to: (i) increased market concentration across many levels of the supply chain; and (ii) issues of self-preferencing and conflict of interest. The Committee recommended that SIDIs should not process the personal data of end consumers (using services of third parties) for providing online advertising services. Further, the Committee opined that regulatory provisions are required to ensure that contracts between news publishers and SSDEIs are fair and transparent.

 

VI. Online e-Markets – The Reality

Platform Markets in turn have spawned: i) Data markets; and ii) Markets for Ideas. These are two markets that other competition authorities around the world have not paid sufficient attention to.

A. Data Markets

Platform markets are primarily dominated by one or two players, often two-sided or multi-sided, who generate considerable data. Data generated on these platforms are valuable for designing goods and services that then generate further consumer data, in turn sold in a separate market called Data Markets. Data is monetized with data markets emerging.

Algorithms create spaces to surf platforms and for linking markets. Firms that can develop their own websites and not rely on listing by major platforms provide the requisite competitive constraints. In India, most start-ups create their own websites. Most Indian consumers interact with these on a daily basis, even for daily grocery shopping, using websites from firms such as Swiggy and Zomato, which create a competitive atmosphere. Surprisingly, radio taxis using broadband are not considered to be platforms although they interact through a main platform.

The initial cases raised against platforms were on agreements- Section 3(4) of CA02. Later cases filed against platforms were predicated on Abuse of Dominance – Section 4. These cases were focused on Amazon and Flipkart, and included: a) Deep discounts offered by platforms as compared to prices offered by brick-and-mortar shops; b) Price Parity Clauses; c) Exclusive Agreements; d) Platform to Business Contract terms; e) Platform Neutrality; f) Algorithmic collusion; g) access to large amounts of consumer data, and related privacy concerns.

Several cases brought before the commission helped convince us that access to data enables profiling of consumers and can lead to locking effects. Data becomes an asset that can be bought and sold – or just rented out – emerging as the “new oil” for business.

In a Suo Moto investigation in 2021, when WhatsApp made it mandatory for users of their platform to accept their “Terms and Conditions,” CCI’s investigation into the co-joint markets of OTT messaging and Online Display Advertising found violations to Sections 4(2)(a)(i) (dominant enterprise imposing unfair conditions – take it or leave it); 4(2)(c) (denial of market access), & 4(2)(e)(leveraging of dominance). Under Section 27 of the Competition Act, the commission then levied a penalty of Rs. 213 crs (US$ 25.4m) on Meta

Access to data on Indian consumers is available from several sources, including surveys of health and household consumption rates. Indian firm Catamaran, for instance, partnered with Amazon in a joint venture intended to exploit these data markets. Reference is to Big Data and represent market power of large platforms. Issues that come up are: Who owns the data? Do consumers have a share in their data or is that simply the “fee” for surfing? Is data privacy an anti-trust issue, as alleged by the EU Commission? Can privacy walls be built through the use of AI? These questions and concerns need to be studied by Authorities before expanding their scope of intervention from ex post to ex ante actions. Governments have announced several other legislative actions, including on Privacy and Data Protection. They are in the negotiating stages as emergent platforms of startups.

In the early years of the CCI, the predominance of Section 3 was the historical concern with cartels, which was brought into focus by “unwritten agreements.” Recent cases are now focused on consumer data, privacy, and issues pertaining to Data Markets.

B. Standard Essential Patents (“SEPs”): Markets for Ideas

Standard Essential Patents (“SEPs”) become important alongside Data Markets. SEPs refer to a bundle of patents approved by any Standard Setting Organization for interoperability and/or meeting global standards. They need to meet FRAND or RAND compliance requirements. As the whole bundle has to be bought together, this leaves little scope for Authorities to act on the bundle. Licensing Fee requirements and the institutional structure of SEPs vary.

Tying of patents into a bundle attracts both Section 3(4) Agreements or Section 4: AoD or both sections of the Act. Cases against Ericsson filed with CCI touched different dimensions of SEPs laying the foundations for a separate market: Market for Ideas, as an emergent market that combines roots of knowledge, access to patents and patent rights for innovators this market is an area of major discussion. I hope our future areas of discussion will focus on knowledge and innovation emphasizing the institutional strengths of India with that of EU.

VII. Interventions

Some of the measures suggested come from the Google case combined with the mandatory use of the Googles Play’s Billing System (“GPBS”). The focus is on developing business rules that consider online markets.

CCI Media emphasis has drawn from the Google Orders and the ten rules of appropriate behavior for a dominant player in e-markets as stated above on the Big Techs at the global level as stated above. CCI has also drawn rules of competitive behavior for Big Techs at local level. Penalties have been levied on all three. The two Google Orders are on the mandatory use of Google Play’s Billing System (“GPBS”) and on the agreements that smart-phone manufacturers have to agree for installation of Android. Make My Trip and OYO were fined were fined for restrictions on hosting travel firms on their OTA (Online Travel Agency).

ANI a news agency sues Open AI in a New Delhi Court accusing ChatGPT of using its published content without permission to train its artificial model.

In this framework how do overtures of protectionist policies pan out? Three concerns emerge.

  • First, we are dealing with cross-border commerce and services that cannot be restricted to national boundaries. Online marketplaces are multi-sided platforms that connect sellers, buyers and advertisers to facilitate transactions between them. A platform offers a multisided environment that internalizes transaction costs and takes advantage of network effects across different user groups.
  • Second, Indian companies – and especially emerging software companies – are keyed into global markets. Third-party online marketplaces play a central role in e-commerce in India. An estimated 64 percent of digital retail trade in India is through online platforms. While large brands or retailers own and manage popular standalone websites, online commerce in India is driven largely by third party platforms. Intermediation by online platforms allows for an online presence of businesses, without being required to operate their own websites. The indirect network effects contribute to the growing importance of online platforms and most sellers and services.
  • Third, and perhaps the most significant point, is that companies – including new ventures – have global shareholding patterns. For instance, Amazon owns shares in Jio the Indian platform market, as well as in Flipkart and other similar competitors.

VIII. Conclusion

“Obsession was with size and market power is a historical obsession of earlier regulations and control policies raising several uncomfortable questions on the assessment of emergent platform market or data markets and in the case of bundled patents.” (A Commissioner’s Primer to Economics of Competition Law in India; Geeta Gouri, Palgrave Macmillan, p.3)

The two prime questions are:

  • Do the emergent markets viz data markets and markets for ideas require regulation by the competition authorities?
  • What form of regulation is appropriate?

The ten market rules set out by CCI suggest that markets need to be shaped under a prevailing mindset of market apprehensions. This is more representative of a protectionist approach to markets. Markets shift and change to business requirements. Regulators are slow in their responses. Less regulation in digital markets is a preferred option to the few SSDEs.

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[1] Former Member of the Competition Commission of India. This paper is based on public comments at the ASPIRE Advisory Board Meeting at Florence hosted by the European University Institute (EUI) in January 2025.