Compliance and Individual Sanctions for Competition Law Infringements

Compliance and Individual Sanctions for Competition Law Infringements

Florian Wagner-von Papp (University College London)
Abstract:      This chapter describes the status quo of criminal enforcement in selected Member States of the European Union and discusses the desirability of criminal enforcement of competition law from a policy perspective. It concludes that at least in Germany the introduction of a criminal offence for horizontal hardcore cartels beyond the existing bid-rigging offence would be desirable, provided an automatic criminal immunity provision for immunity recipients under a leniency programme within the European Competition Network is introduced and the Bundeskartellamt is involved in the criminal prosecution. The introduction of effective criminal enforcement would make compliance training both more important and more effective. Criminalisation makes compliance more important because compliance training helps to spread knowledge about the criminal offence — and only a known threat can deter. Criminalisation makes compliance training more effective because the participants of compliance sessions are motivated to pay attention to avoid criminal liability.