Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Jan Peter van der Veer (RBB Economics) discusses Antitrust Scrutiny of Most-Favoured-Customer Clauses: An Economic Analysis
ABSTRACT: MFN clauses are subject to increasing antitrust scrutiny. Whilst MFNs may give rise to anticompetitive effects both at the level of the buyer and the seller, harm to competition cannot be presumed. MFNs can give rise to efficiencies, for example by promoting investment. Evaluating the competitive effects of MFNs requires a case-by-case analysis.
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