A PYMNTS Company

Cartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations

By  |  January 7, 2013

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

    Get the Full Story

    Complete the form to unlock this article and enjoy unlimited free access to all PYMNTS content — no additional logins required.

    yesSubscribe to our daily newsletter, PYMNTS Today.

    By completing this form, you agree to receive marketing communications from PYMNTS and to the sharing of your information with our sponsor, if applicable, in accordance with our Privacy Policy and Terms and Conditions.

    Kai Huschelrath (Centre for European Economic Research), Ulrich Laitenberger (Centre for European Economic Research – Industrial Economics and International Management Research) and Florian Smuda (Centre for European Economic Research) analyze Cartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations.

    ABSTRACT: We provide an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement decisions between 2000 and 2011. Following an initial characterisation of our dataset, we especially investigate the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations. We are able to identify several key drivers of investigation length such as the Commission’s speed of cartel detection, the type of cartel agreement, the affected industry or the existence of a chief witness.