Pieter Kalbfleisch, Nov 05, 2010
Would it lead to more effective sanctioning of cartel violations if attention were shifted from sanctioning undertakings to primarily sanctioning those individuals who, de facto, either exercised leadership over or gave instructions to a cartel violation, along with those who refrained from taking any measures to stop the violation, even though they had the power to stop the violation or to prevent it from happening? This article will examine why the answer to this question is both yes and no.
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