James Cooper, Luke Froeb, Daniel O’Brien, Michael Vita, Sep 01, 2005
Until theory can be used to determine how likely it is that a restraint will lead to an anticompetitive outcome, decision makers will be left with a considerable amount of uncertainty. In this world, enforcement decisions should be guided by prior beliefs and loss functions. The authors review of the existing empirical evidence which informs their priors suggests that vertical restraints are likely to be benign or welfare-enhancing.
Featured News
New York Puts Businesses on Notice for Algorithmic Pricing
Mar 19, 2026 by
CPI
Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer Expands US Antitrust Team with New Partner Hire
Mar 19, 2026 by
CPI
Mexico Antitrust Authority Fines Oxygen Suppliers Over Exclusive Contracts
Mar 19, 2026 by
CPI
EU Cloud Group Pushes for Halt to Broadcom VMware Changes
Mar 19, 2026 by
CPI
Sen. Blackburn Releases Discussion Draft of Bill to Set Federal ‘Framework’ for AI Policy
Mar 19, 2026 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Data-Driven Competition
Mar 19, 2026 by
CPI
Data-Driven Competition: Implications For Enforcement and Merger Control
Mar 19, 2026 by
Alexandre de Corniere & Greg Taylor
From Tipping to Trustees: Why Data-Driven Markets Require Institutional Design, Not Optimization
Mar 19, 2026 by
Jens Prüfer & Paul de Bijl
Data Barriers to Entry: What We’ve Learned About Spotting Them and What We Still Don’t Know About Solutions
Mar 19, 2026 by
Bruno Carballa-Smichowski
When the Perfect Is the Enemy of the Good: Price Discrimination, Affordability, Precarity and Market Dynamism
Mar 19, 2026 by
Dan Ciuriak