Judicial Review of Antitrust Cases Bo Vesterdorf, Sep 01, 2005 Judicial Review in EC Competition Law: Reflections on the Role of the Community Courts in the EC System of Competition Law Enforcement This paper sets out personal reflections on the role of the judiciary within a primarily administrative system of enforcement of the competition laws. […]

Bo Vesterdorf, Sep 01, 2005 This paper sets out personal reflections on the role of the judiciary within a primarily administrative system of enforcement of the competition laws. The paper first goes through a short description of the basic features of the EC system of competition law enforcement. Second, it addresses the role of the […]

Jean Tirole, Apr 01, 2005 This primer analyzes factors that make ties more likely either to hurt or to benefit consumers. It first identifies factors that influence where the impact of tying on competition in the tied market stands, ranging from little impact on the rivals’ ability to compete to total exclusion of competitors. Then, […]

Barry Nalebuff, Apr 01, 2005 The takeaway point of Tirole’s excellent primer is that tying, while potentially exclusionary, does not deserve special treatment. This commentary offers two reasons why tying should be accorded special treatment. First, unlike predatory pricing, tying offers a monopolist the ability to engage in no-cost predation. A critical component of the […]

David Evans, Apr 01, 2005 Dear Colleagues, We invite you to join a dialogue about competition policy. The conversation that we will have through these pages will be about the past, present and future of antitrust. It will use the increasingly global languages of legal and economic analysis. And we hope it will be carried […]

Margaret Bloom, Apr 01, 2005 Commissioner Mario Monti’s achievements in relation to Article 81 of the EC Treaty include three are major reforms: (1) the modernization of EC competition law; (2) the introduction of a more economics-based analysis for Article 81 cases; (3) and the fight against cartels. An equally significant achievement is Commissioner Monti’s […]

Dennis Carlton, Michael Waldman, Apr 01, 2005 Tirole has written an excellent primer focused on what is known about tying and what he believes is desirable antitrust policy concerning the practice. Although the authors agree with most of Tirole’s arguments, there are two topics for which their perspective is somewhat different. First, he discusses situations […]

Apr 01, 2005 In this article, Oliver Williamson sets out the case for taking efficiency gains into account when analyzing allegedly anticompetitive conduct, especially in the case of mergers. The welfare tradeoff model applies most easily to the case of two firms that merge into a monopoly. The analysis begins by recognizing that in the […]

Frank Easterbrook, Apr 01, 2005 In this article, Frank Easterbrook sets out the basic components of what has become known as the error-cost framework in antitrust, an approach that has gained influence in recent years. This framework recognizes the possibility that courts will make mistakes in deciding antitrust cases, and that those mistakes will result […]

Sep 01, 2005 In this article, Professor Yamey reviews the post-war contributions to the literature and analysis of predatory price cutting. While the point has been made frequently in the literature on predatory pricing that the practice makes little sense where entry into the industry in question is easy, the author gives several examples that […]

Sep 01, 2005 A firm may reduce its prices in an attempt to destroy its rivals or to deter new entry. Although the Sherman Act has long been construed to prohibit this practice, the case law on predatory pricing has been characterized by vagueness and a paucity of economic analysis. In this Article, Professors Areeda […]

Ralph Winter, Sep 01, 2005 Cooper, Froeb, OBrien, and Vita argue that (1) economic theory, especially post-Chicago theory, provides little in the way of unambiguous predictions of when vertical restraints are pro-competitive versus anticompetitive, forcing antitrust decisions to rely mainly on prior empirical evidence rather than case-specific facts; and (2) prior evidence indicates that vertical […]