By Omar Vásquez Duque (Stanford Law School)
This paper analyzes complexities regarding competition torts that work against compensation and evaluates the possibility of enhancing deterrence of anticompetitive behavior by reforming the compensation system. Specifically, diverse attitudes towards “passing-on” defense and damages are analyzed. Then, from a compensation standpoint, the need for class actions is highlighted. This work concludes that damages, from a deterrence perspective, can be assimilated to corporate fines, so enhancing compensation does not produce a significant result in terms of deterrence of anticompetitive behavior.
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