Posted by Social Science Research Network
The Impact of Merger Legislation on Bank Mergers
Elena Carletti (Bocconi University), Steven Ongena (University of Zurich), Jan-Peter Siedlarek (Federal Reserve Banks) & Giancarlo Spagnolo (SITE)
Abstract: We find that stricter merger control legislation increases abnormal announcement returns of targets in bank mergers by 7 percentage points. Analyzing potential explanations for this result, we document an increase in the pre-merger profitability of targets, a decrease in the size of acquirers, and a decreasing share of transactions in which banks are acquired by other banks. Other merger properties, including the size and risk profile of targets, the geographic overlap of merging banks, and the stock market response of rivals appear unaffected. The evidence suggests that the strengthening of merger control leads to more efficient and more competitive transactions.
Featured News
Google ExecAdmitted Firm’s Goal Was to “Crush” Digital Ad Rivals, According to Court Docs
Sep 11, 2024 by
CPI
Former Michigan Football Stars File $50 Million Antitrust Lawsuit Against NCAA
Sep 11, 2024 by
CPI
Oasis Fans Could Be in Line for Ticket Refunds Amid Antitrust Concerns
Sep 11, 2024 by
CPI
FCC Chair Calls for More Competition to SpaceX’s Starlink Network
Sep 11, 2024 by
CPI
Singapore Salon Director Jailed for Contempt in Consumer Protection Case
Sep 11, 2024 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Canada & Mexico
Sep 3, 2024 by
CPI
Competitive Convergence: Mexico’s 30-Year Quest for Antitrust Parity with its Northern Neighbor
Sep 3, 2024 by
CPI
Competition and Digital Markets in North America: A Comparative Study of Antitrust Investigations in Mexico and the United States
Sep 3, 2024 by
CPI
Recent Antitrust Development in Mexico: COFECE’s Preliminary Report on Amazon and Mercado Libre
Sep 3, 2024 by
CPI
The Cost of Making COFECE Disappear
Sep 3, 2024 by
CPI