Michael Salinger, Apr 01, 2006
With a major set of hearings scheduled in the United States on the antitrust treatment of single-firm conduct, economists have an opportunity to provide analysis that informs policy. Yet, the opportunity will be lost if economic analysis does not provide insights into how to distinguish anticompetitive from pro-competitive behavior. The authors argue that the economics literature on one type of single-firm conduct”tying”has been less influential than it should have been, and examine whether there are lessons to be learned from that failure. The authors argue that the two principal causes are 1) the almost complete neglect of competitive tying (while focusing heavily on anticompetitive tying) and 2) an excessive reliance on theory alone.
Featured News
Judge Halts New York Ban on Algorithmic Rent-Setting Software
Sep 30, 2026 by
CPI
Zillow Must Face Agent Antitrust Claims After Judge Rejects Dismissal Bid
Sep 30, 2026 by
CPI
California Expands Antitrust Law With New Powers to Target Monopolies
Sep 30, 2026 by
CPI
South Korea Antitrust Watchdog Moves Toward Sanctions Against Korean Air, Asiana
Sep 30, 2026 by
CPI
RealPage Wins Preliminary Injunction Against New York Algorithmic Rent-Setting Ban
Sep 30, 2026 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – National Security
Sep 22, 2026 by
CPI
National Security in U.S. Antitrust Enforcement: Toward a More Disciplined Framework
Sep 22, 2026 by
Rod Rosenstein & Timothy Finley
The Department of War’s M&A Review Guidance: What Companies in the Defense Industry Need to Know
Sep 22, 2026 by
Eric Stocking & Paul Ney
National Security, Resilience and the Boundaries of Merger Control
Sep 22, 2026 by
Beatriz Marques
National Security and Competition: Building Resilient Telecommunications Networks
Sep 22, 2026 by
Roslyn Layton