Foreclosure

By Serge Moresi & Marius Schwartz*   A vertical merger between a firm and an input supplier to that firm can generate efficiencies by eliminating double marginalization or alleviating other contracting inefficiencies. However, when the supplier also sells to that firm’s rivals, a key antitrust concern is input foreclosure: the merged firm might raise its […]

Posted by Social Science Research Network Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement By Steven C. Salop (Georgetown University) Abstract:     This short symposium article explains why and how vertical merger enforcement can and should be invigorated. Vertical merger enforcement has been an intended victim of an overdose of Chicago-School economics and laissez-faire ideology. In our modern market […]

Posted by Social Science Research Network Intellectual Property and Competition Law By C. Scott Hemphill (New York University) Abstract:      This chapter, prepared for the Oxford Handbook of Intellectual Property Law, surveys the intersection of competition law — or antitrust law, as it is known in the United States — with intellectual property (IP). […]

Posted by Social Science Research Network Exclusion in Digital Markets By Konstantinos Stylianou (University of Leeds) Abstract:     Exclusionary practices and effects are at the core of antitrust enforcement and sector-specific regulation, as they serve as one of the main determinants of the competitive conditions in the market. The antitrust treatment and regulation of exclusion […]

Dennis Carlton, Michael Waldman, Apr 01, 2005 Tirole has written an excellent primer focused on what is known about tying and what he believes is desirable antitrust policy concerning the practice. Although the authors agree with most of Tirole’s arguments, there are two topics for which their perspective is somewhat different. First, he discusses situations […]