David Evans, Jun 09, 2012
This column is about the antitrust of “multi-sided platforms.” These creatures, which are also known as “two-sided markets”, play critical roles in a lot of industries. Examples include Apple’s mobile software platform, Deutsche Bourse’s financial exchange platforms, Facebook’s social networking platform, Google’s search engine, Monster’s job board, News Corp’s advertising businesses, Sotheby’s auction house, Simon’s Mall, and Visa International. They range from the old (the village matchmaker) to the new (mobile-based social networking).
The concept of multi-sided platforms was introduced a bit more than a decade ago. Today, there are hundreds of articles by economists on the topic, many of which are relevant to antitrust practitioners, and dozens of articles in law reviews. The economics of multi-sided platforms has been a key topic in antitrust cases around the world in industries ranging from advertising to payments to shopping malls.
This column provides a place for economists and lawyers to discuss competition policy towards multi-sided platforms. We’re looking for contributors to this monthly column and hope to get a vibrant debate going. The column is going to focus on anything that’s of interest to the antitrust community surrounding multi-sided platforms. Submissions should be in range of 800-2000 words.
I’m going to kick the series off with a discussion of how platforms deal with customers who do bad things and why this matters for competition policy. If you want some background on multi-sided platforms you might want to check out my online course on multi-sided platforms for business professionals, the course Dick Schmalensee and I gave on the antitrust of multi-sided platforms, and collection of essays on platform economics.
Links to Full Content
Featured News
Judge Mehta Questions Both Sides in Landmark Google Antitrust Case
May 2, 2024 by
CPI
FCC Urges Urgent Funding for Removal of Chinese Telecom Equipment from U.S. Networks
May 2, 2024 by
CPI
Former Pioneer CEO Facing Potential Criminal Charges For Colluding With OPEC
May 2, 2024 by
CPI
South Korea’s Antitrust Regulator Greenlights K-Pop Powerhouse Deal
May 2, 2024 by
CPI
Exxon’s Pioneer Purchase Approved, Former CEO Barred from Board
May 2, 2024 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Economics of Criminal Antitrust
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
Navigating Economic Expert Work in Criminal Antitrust Litigation
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
The Increased Importance of Economics in Cartel Cases
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
A Law and Economics Analysis of the Antitrust Treatment of Physician Collective Price Agreements
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
Information Exchange In Criminal Antitrust Cases: How Economic Testimony Can Tip The Scales
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI