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Analyzing Robinson-Patman

By  |  July 21, 2015

Posted by Social Science Research Network

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    Analyzing Robinson-Patman D. Daniel Sokol (University of Florida)

    Abstract: The Robinson-Patman Act protects inefficient competitors rather than consumers. The possibility of a suit brought under Robinson-Patman increases the costs of efficient competitors. As such, Robinson-Patman shifts the benefit of antitrust from consumers to less efficient competitors. The Act is fundamentally in tension with contemporary antitrust policy. This article explores the history of Robinson-Patman, shifts in Robinson-Patman case law, and how the FTC may have aided (or not) the change in legal outcomes of Robinson-Patman cases.