Institutional Design and Federal Antitrust Enforcement Agencies: Renovation or Revolution?
Michael McFalls, Sep 11, 2014
Institutional design, properly defined, both circumscribes and defines the practice of antitrust law in the United States. The structure of antitrust law and enforcement in the United States reflects so many disparate strands of political thought and expression that it seems almost impossible that it could function, much less cohere. But that very mixture of currents and cross-currents is quintessentially American — and keeps the importance of institutional design very much alive and significant in U.S. antitrust law. And although fundamental reinvention is unlikely, incremental changes are both possible and desirable, particularly those within the discretion of the enforcement agencies themselves. Below, we discuss what kinds of changes may be useful for the enforcement agencies to consider.
Featured News
New York Puts Businesses on Notice for Algorithmic Pricing
Mar 19, 2026 by
CPI
Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer Expands US Antitrust Team with New Partner Hire
Mar 19, 2026 by
CPI
Mexico Antitrust Authority Fines Oxygen Suppliers Over Exclusive Contracts
Mar 19, 2026 by
CPI
EU Cloud Group Pushes for Halt to Broadcom VMware Changes
Mar 19, 2026 by
CPI
Sen. Blackburn Releases Discussion Draft of Bill to Set Federal ‘Framework’ for AI Policy
Mar 19, 2026 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Data-Driven Competition
Mar 19, 2026 by
CPI
Data-Driven Competition: Implications For Enforcement and Merger Control
Mar 19, 2026 by
Alexandre de Corniere & Greg Taylor
From Tipping to Trustees: Why Data-Driven Markets Require Institutional Design, Not Optimization
Mar 19, 2026 by
Jens Prüfer & Paul de Bijl
Data Barriers to Entry: What We’ve Learned About Spotting Them and What We Still Don’t Know About Solutions
Mar 19, 2026 by
Bruno Carballa-Smichowski
When the Perfect Is the Enemy of the Good: Price Discrimination, Affordability, Precarity and Market Dynamism
Mar 19, 2026 by
Dan Ciuriak