What Remedies for Abuses of Dominant Positions? An Economic Analysis of the EC’s Decisions
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Patrice Bougette (University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis – Law, Economics, and Management Research Group, LAMETA CNRS) and Frederic M. Marty (Research Group on Law, Economics and Management) analyze What Remedies for Abuses of Dominant Positions? An Economic Analysis of the EC’s Decisions.
ABSTRACT: Among other factors, one can assess the efficacy of a competition authority by its ability to choose and implement its remedies. Up until now, a dense economic literature has emerged on retrospective merger studies to measure the efficacy of merger control. Yet, little attention has been given to remedies in the other major pillar of competition policy, i.e. abuses of dominant position. In this paper, we try to fill the gap by first highlighting what is at stake and second analyse the most emblematic cases. We focus on the European Commission, while U.S. cases serve us as benchmark.
Featured News
Justice Department Moves to End NCAA Transfer Rule
May 30, 2024 by
CPI
Kenya’s Competition Authority Proposes Tougher Regulations on Big Tech
May 30, 2024 by
CPI
KKR Secures EU Antitrust Approval for $24 Billion Acquisition of Telecom Italia’s Fixed-Line Network
May 30, 2024 by
CPI
European Court Sides with Tech Giants in Italian Regulatory Dispute
May 30, 2024 by
CPI
US Steel and Nippon Steel Secure International Approvals for $14.9B Merger
May 30, 2024 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Healthcare Antitrust
May 31, 2024 by
CPI
AI and Antitrust Considerations in U.S. Health Care
May 31, 2024 by
CPI
Uncertainty in the Bottom Line: New Antitrust Scrutiny and Enforcement in Private Equity Transactions
May 31, 2024 by
CPI
Effecting M&A Diligence When Competitors Are Involved
May 31, 2024 by
CPI
AI, Pharmaceutical Sector, and EU Competition Law and Policy: What Does the Future Look Like?
May 31, 2024 by
CPI