In this Chillin’ Competition post, author Pablo Ibañez Colomo shares his new paper looking at the Court of Justice’s ruling in Android Auto and its substantive and institutional consequences for refusal-to-deal doctrine. He notes that the decision marks a significant shift in EU competition law, one that may not yet be fully appreciated. In particular, applying the Court’s reasoning in Android Auto to the facts of the landmark Bronner case would likely have produced a different outcome, removing the need to show indispensability to establish abuse.
Colomo explains that this change stems from how Android Auto reinterprets the indispensability requirement. Whereas earlier cases like Bronner and Magill assessed indispensability by reference to the market in which the refusal occurred, the Android Auto approach recognizes that where a dominant firm engages with third parties in one market (market A), it cannot invoke indispensability to justify refusal in a related market (market B). This re-reading significantly narrows the scope of refusal-to-deal jurisprudence.
The post emphasizes that the implications extend beyond digital platforms, though they are especially relevant there given the mix of open and closed systems run by major players. More broadly, the judgment enables intervention that goes further than simply requiring access — dominant firms may be required to adapt their assets to accommodate third-party needs, effectively transforming parts of their infrastructure into cooperative ventures…