Cartel Organization, Price Discrimination and the Trans-Atlantic Passage, 1899-1911
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
George Deltas (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) and Richard A. Sicotte (University of Vermont) discuss Cartel Organization, Price Discrimination and the Trans-Atlantic Passage, 1899-1911
ABSTRACT: This paper studies the operation of trans-Atlantic passenger shipping cartels during the period 1899-1911 and its effects on passenger traffic. We systematically document and categorize cartel agreements on the basis of key aspects of internal organization. Then, we exploit the variation in internal organization across markets and over time to investigate whether any specific organizational aspects were more effective in reducing flows from competitive levels. We find some evidence that the assessment of fines for violations of the agreement enhanced collusion, but no evidence that the posting of bonds (to guarantee the fines) or the formation of pooling arrangements had any incremental effect. We also take advantage of the richness of the data on passenger flows to show that collusion had a smaller effect on first and second-class passenger flows relative to third class service. Finally, we provide estimates of consumer substitution across passenger classes due to collusion and show that such substitution was small but non-negligible, especially during periods of normal cartel operation. Our study has broader implications for the theory of collusion, and on how collusion affects the quality, rather than the quantity, of products purchased by consumers.
Featured News
College Sports Leaders in Intensive Talks to Settle NIL Antitrust Case Against NCAA
Apr 30, 2024 by
CPI
EU Investigates Facebook’s and Instagram’s Handling of Disinformation Ahead of Elections
Apr 30, 2024 by
CPI
Antitrust Lawsuit Targets Hotel Giants for Alleged Price Fixing with AI
Apr 30, 2024 by
CPI
ABA Seeks to Join FTC Lawsuit Against Amazon Over Antitrust Concerns
Apr 30, 2024 by
CPI
Google Agrees to Pay News Corp for AI-Related Content
Apr 30, 2024 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Economics of Criminal Antitrust
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
Navigating Economic Expert Work in Criminal Antitrust Litigation
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
The Increased Importance of Economics in Cartel Cases
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
A Law and Economics Analysis of the Antitrust Treatment of Physician Collective Price Agreements
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
Information Exchange In Criminal Antitrust Cases: How Economic Testimony Can Tip The Scales
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI