Richard Schmalensee, May 17, 2011
Jeffrey Rohlfs’ pioneering 1974 study of demand in the presence of network externalities, which make each actor’s demand for some good or service depend in part on whether others purchase it, laid the foundation for a huge academic literature that has had a major impact on antitrust policy. The government’s case in U.S. v. Microsoft, for instance, relied heavily on network externality arguments.
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