This article considers the potential anticompetitive effects of common ownership by institutional investors in concentrated industries from a corporate governance perspective and questions the hypothesis that companies in concentrated industries are pressed by institutional investors into anti-competitive conduct. It concludes that restricting institutional investor investment and related governance engagement would have broad implications outside the antitrust policy sphere that deserve careful consideration.
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